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TOO BIG TO SUPERVISE: THE RISE OF
FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES AND THE
DECLINE OF DISCRETIONARY
OVERSIGHT IN BANKING
Lev Menand†

The authority of government officials to define and eliminate “unsafe and unsound” banking practices is one of the
oldest and broadest powers in U.S. banking law. But this
authority has been neglected in the recent literature, in part
because of a movement in the 1990s to convert many supervisory judgments about “safety and soundness” into bright-line
rules. This movement did not entirely do away with discretionary oversight, but it refocused supervisors on compliance,
risk management, and governance—in other words, on internal bank processes.
Drawing on the rules versus standards debate, this Article develops a taxonomy for parsing the various approaches to
banking law and documents a shift in supervisory policy over
the last thirty years. It shows how today’s focus on internal
bank processes, a policy called risk-focused supervision
(RFS), was the result of a deregulatory agenda that reconceptualized the role of banks in the economy and led to the emergence of large, complex banking organizations (LCBOs).
Unlike traditional banks, LCBOs engage in a wide range of
nonmonetary financial activities, including market making in
derivatives and corporate securities and investing in private
equity funds. The policymakers who designed this new system believed that government oversight of LCBOs was costly
and unnecessary—if even possible. Therefore, they constructed a new legal framework based on facilitating market
discipline through RFS and risk-based capital requirements.
Although most officials today repudiate “market discipline” and the philosophy underlying the pre-crisis legal
framework, the pillars of that framework remain intact. Moreover, the future of the Fed’s innovative stress tests – which
represent a resurgence in traditional safety and soundness
† The author would like to thank David Grewal, Bob Hockett, Saule
Omarova, Amias Gerety, Daniel Herz-Roiphe, Morgan Ricks, Art Wilmarth,
Jonathan Macey, Tom Noone, Stephanie Chaly, Yesha Yadav, Mark Kaufman,
Rahul Prabhakar, David Pearl, Robert Post, and Louis Menand for helpful and
thoughtful comments, suggestions, and advice.
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oversight is in doubt. Ultimately, today’s conglomerates,
which engage in both monetary and nonmonetary activities,
may be, as policymakers in the 1990s first postulated, too big
to supervise in the traditional sense. This is a problem because a framework that relies on market oversight or rules
alone is unlikely to prevent excessive risk taking and the procyclical expansion of bank balance sheets. It is time, therefore, to reconsider the proper role of banks in the economy and
our legal strategies for ensuring a stable and efficient monetary system.
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INTRODUCTION
Wells Fargo is one of the largest banks in the United States,
and also one of the country’s most closely supervised businesses.1 Yet, over the course of a decade, Wells Fargo issued
millions of unwanted debit and credit cards and fraudulently
opened millions of checking and savings accounts for hundreds of thousands of unsuspecting customers.2 In 2016, in
response to this scandal, the head of the nation’s primary
banking supervisor, the Comptroller of the Currency, commissioned a report to determine why his agency, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), had not caught the problem sooner. His report, released in April 2017, concluded that,
while the OCC’s Large Bank Office had been aware of 700
whistleblower complaints about Wells Fargo’s sales practices in
2010,3 its oversight had been “untimely and ineffective” because its supervisors had been “focused too heavily on bank
processes versus what those processes were actually reporting.”4 In other words, the OCC had checked to make sure that
Wells Fargo had a whistleblower program, but not that the
bank had addressed the complaints it had received through
that program.5
What the OCC’s report did not say, and what I argue here,
is that this myopia was the result of an intentional policy
choice made in the late 1990s to change how the government
supervises and regulates banks. In other words, the OCC’s
heavy focus on Wells Fargo’s processes was not a mistake; it
was by design. As Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) Alan Greenspan described the
shift back in 1996: “[S]upervisors’ evaluation of [banks] will be
focused [more] on process, and less on historical records.”6
According to Greenspan, if supervisors focused on “processes”
1
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C: WELLS FARGO & CO. 13–14 (Aug. 9,
2017).
2
See Stacy Cowley & Jennifer A. Kingson, Wells Fargo to Claw Back $75
Million From 2 Former Executives, N. Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 10, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/business/wells-fargo-pay-executives-accountsscandal.html [http://perma.cc/5BJD-6UXB].
3
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW
OF SUPERVISION OF SALES PRACTICES AT WELLS FARGO 5 (2017).
4
Id. at 4–5.
5
When OCC examiners asked Wells Fargo’s executives about the numerous
complaints, the bank’s executives told the examiners that the high volume was a
sign that its whistleblower process was working. Id. at 5.
6
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks to the Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan: Banking in the
Global Marketplace 8 (Nov. 18, 1996) (transcript available at https://
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and not “after-the-fact results,” then the market, rather than
the government, could do the work of disciplining banks, reducing “moral hazard and inefficient bank management.”7 The
Fed called this approach “risk-focused supervision” (RFS).8
RFS—still the official policy of the OCC’s Large Bank Office
today—is not so much about evaluating risk appetite and risktaking as it is about evaluating risk management, internal controls, and the quality of a bank’s public disclosures.
The rise of RFS was part of a sea change in the relationship
between banks and the government. For most of U.S. history,
banks were permitted to engage only in monetary activities: to
issue deposits, originate high-quality credit assets, and settle
payment flows. To aid banks in doing these things, beginning
in the 1930s, the government insured their deposits and offered them access to cheap liquidity, allowing them to trade on
the government’s full faith and credit.9 In return, Congress
subjected banks to extensive monitoring by special government
officials called supervisors, who scrutinized banks’ capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, and liquidity, as well as the
honesty and integrity of banks’ management. Congress empowered these supervisors to require banks and their directors,
officers, employees, and agents to correct “unsafe or unsound”
practices,10 meaning “any action, or lack of action, which is
contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation,
the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be
abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administrating the insurance funds.”11
As one official summed up the prevailing view at the time: the
“widespread consequences of misconduct or bad judgment” at
a bank “are such as to require governmental rather than market sanction.”12
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961118.htm) [https://
perma.cc/4776-Z2UG].
7
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks Before the International Conference of Banking Supervisors: Bank Supervision in a World Economy 15–16 (June 13, 1996) (transcript available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19960613.htm)
[https://perma.cc/7N92-TEG3].
8
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. RESERVE, SR 99-15, SUPERVISORY LETTER ON RISK-FOCUSED SUPERVISION OF LARGE COMPLEX BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (1999) [hereinafter SUPERVISORY LETTER, SR 99-15].
9
See discussion infra subpart II.A.
10
See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2016).
11
See 112 CONG. REC. 26,445, 26,474 (1966).
12
Gerald T. Dunne, The Legal Basis of Bank Supervision, 10 ST. LOUIS B.J.
31, 35–37 (1964).
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To ensure that supervisors had wide latitude in carrying
out their duties, Congress did not explicitly define “unsafe and
unsound” or “prudent operation.” Because banks were businesses “affected with a public interest,”13 Congress wanted supervisors to be able to address deficiencies “when[ever] an
institution ha[d] been harmed or the interests of the depositors
ha[d] been prejudiced without requiring the agencies to quantify the harm or [the] prejudice.”14
Beginning in the late 1980s, however, a group of policymakers reimagined the role of banks in the economy and the
role of government in banking. These officials—economists like
Greenspan and financiers like Robert Rubin—sought to facilitate the growth of financial conglomerates by tearing down the
statutory restrictions that limited banks to performing monetary functions.15 The firms that emerged became known as
large complex banking organizations (LCBOs).
As LCBOs grew far larger than traditional banks and began
engaging in all sorts of activities not historically supervised by
the government, Greenspan and others decided that the government could not and should not oversee their operations in
the same way that they had overseen the operations of traditional banks in the past. Not only did Fed officials think that
LCBOs were too big and complex to supervise using traditional
means, they also concluded that discretionary “safety and
soundness” oversight was inefficient and costly. Instead, they
developed rules called risk-based capital requirements that required bank shareholders to contribute a minimum amount of
money, called equity or capital, to fund a bank’s investments.
The Fed and the OCC thought that capital requirements could,
in effect, replace traditional oversight by ensuring that shareholders’ stakes in banks would be large enough to allow the
government to outsource safety and soundness work to credit
rating agencies and professional investors.16
13
See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126–30 (1877) (differentiating
businesses affected with a public interest).
14
H.R. REP. NO. 101-222, at 439 (1989) (Conf. Rep.). Courts also accord wide
deference to agency judgments in banking. See Indep. Bankers Ass’n of Am. v.
Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1168–69 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that the “discretionary
authority” of the banking agencies “to define and eliminate ‘unsafe and unsound
conduct’ is to be liberally construed”).
15
See Lisa M. DeFerrari & David E. Palmer, Supervision of Large Complex
Banking Organizations, FED. RES. BULL. 47, 50 (2001) (discussing LCBOs and their
supervision).
16
See Laurence H. Meyer, Supervising Large Complex Banking Organizations:
Adapting to Change, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T 97
(Frederic S. Mishkin ed., 2001). Interestingly, for smaller firms—those not staffed
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In this new regime, policymakers envisioned just two tasks
for traditional supervisors: (1) enforcing the capital rules to
ensure that shareholders were sufficiently incentivized to oversee risk-taking adequately and (2) policing “processes”—governance frameworks, internal controls, and risk management
techniques—to ensure that shareholders were sufficiently informed to oversee risk-taking effectively.17 The latter task,
policymakers thought, was necessary to prevent LCBO executives from hiding material information about their activities
from market participants. RFS, in other words, was designed
to combat the principal-agent problem between managers and
shareholders—not to prevent excessive risk-taking or directly
ensure safety and soundness.
Following the financial crisis, the lynchpin of this new philosophy—the idea that market oversight could replace government lawmaking—was largely repudiated. And yet, as reflected
in the Wells Fargo episode, supervisors continue to focus on
processes and not results.18 Indeed, the OCC’s Large Bank
Supervision Handbook still states that its examiners “do not
attempt to restrict risk-taking but rather [to] determine
whether banks identify and effectively manage the risks they
assume.”19 All the while, the pathologies of RFS—blindingly
apparent in the Wells Fargo report—have gone largely undiagnosed.20 The academic literature continues to focus on the
“regulatory” and “structural” aspects of banking law: the rules
promulgated by the banking agencies and the legal provisions,
typically enacted directly by statute, which determine what
forms of financial support banks receive from the government,
what types of activities banks can engage in, and who bears the
loss if banks fail. Supervision, when it is mentioned, is often
by sophisticated financiers and subject to the salutary forces of the capital markets—policymakers decided that supervisors should continue to assess “results”
(through a program the OCC calls risk-based supervision). See OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LARGE BANK SUPERVISION: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK
1–2 (2010); see also DeFerrari & Palmer, supra note 15, at 51–53.
17
See Meyer, supra note 16, at 100.
18
This Article argues the opposite of JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 579–80 (2016) (suggesting that supervision has become more
discretionary and less rules-based over the last twenty-five years).
19
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 16, at 3.
20
But see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT
170–71, 307–08 (2011) (noting that the “risk-focused” approach to supervision
contributed to supervisors’ failure to address growing risk levels); Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern International Financial Regulation: Increasing
Reliance on a Public-Private Partnership, 37 INT’L LAW. 43, 44–47 (2003) (assessing
the rise of RFS).
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conflated with regulation, as if the former were merely the enforcement side of the latter.21
This Article seeks to give supervisory policy its due—to
explain why, two decades ago, the government shifted its approach to overseeing banks, particularly large ones like Wells
Fargo, and to show how this change was part of a larger reorientation of banking’s legal architecture.
It proceeds in three parts. Part I develops a taxonomy,
drawing from the legal literature on rules and standards.
Rules, roughly speaking, are bright-line requirements developed in advance of actual application (e.g., “the speed limit is
60 miles per hour”). Standards are general requirements that
must be tailored ex post to address specific cases (e.g., “drive
safely”).22 As the existing rules versus standards debate fails to
account for the wide range of approaches to bank lawmaking,
subpart I.A differentiates between two ways of writing rules
and two ways of enforcing standards. One way of enforcing a
standard, by interrogating outcomes or results, I call substantive oversight. Another way of enforcing a standard, by evaluating the processes that lead to those outcomes or results, I call
procedural oversight. In banking, for example, instead of defining “unsafe and unsound” in terms of “what” risks a bank is
taking, supervisors, practicing RFS, define it in terms of “how”
a bank is taking risks.
To address the “what” part of the equation, the Fed and the
OCC now rely on market oversight and formulas. A formula is a
type of rule that delineates between permissible and impermissible variants of an activity in advance, restricting as little salutary activity as possible. The risk-based capital requirements,
for example, are a formula. Another type of rule, which I call a
ban, is prophylactic, intentionally overbroad, and simple.
When choosing how to regulate an activity, policymakers have
three choices: they can prohibit the activity (with a ban); permit
21
See Thomas Eisenbach et al., Supervising Large, Complex Financial Institutions: What Do Supervisors Do?, ECON. POL’Y REV., Feb. 2017, at 57–58 (noting the
widespread conflation of supervision and regulation). When supervision is treated
independently, it is often given short shrift. In one of the leading textbooks on
financial institutions law, for example, thirteen pages out of 1,246 are devoted to
bank supervision and enforcement; RFS is not mentioned at all. See MICHAEL S.
BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 831–36, 841–49 (2016). As
Professor Roberta Romano aptly puts it, supervisors today are an adjutant “directed at assessing the adequacy of a bank’s capital” under the Basel rules.
Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 10
(2014).
22
See discussion infra subpart I.A.
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the activity and differentiate between permissible and impermissible variants ex post (through substantive oversight); or
permit the activity and differentiate between permissible and
impermissible variants ex ante (with a formula).
Part II documents a shift in the choices made by policymakers in banking, charting the decline of a legal regime based
on structural bans and substantive oversight and the rise of a
legal regime based on formulas (e.g., risk-based capital requirements) and procedural oversight (e.g., RFS). I examine thirty
years of public remarks by Fed and OCC officials, and tease out
the reasons why they created RFS and risk-based capital requirements. The modern regime, I conclude, is founded upon a
belief that banks are no different from other businesses and
that targeted government policies designed to counteract the
effects of deposit insurance can ensure that the market, not the
government, disciplines their executives and advances the
public interest.
Part III seeks to explain why this framework endures. It
focuses on the difficulty of substantively overseeing nonmonetary financial activities and the enormous pressure large conglomerates exert on the banking agencies. Not only do banks
prefer rules, but procedural oversight insulates government officials from legal, professional, and political risks. Part III also
considers the Fed’s innovative stress testing program, the
Comprehensive Capital Assessment and Review (CCAR), which
represents a rebirth of traditional oversight.23 CCAR allows
supervisors to make independent judgments about banks’
risk-taking. Yet increasingly, banks are insisting on changes
to CCAR, which would convert it to a rules-based exercise. If
the industry succeeds in its efforts, as seems likely, it will suggest that today’s financial conglomerates are simply too “big”
(in terms of activities, if not assets) to supervise in the traditional sense. Unfortunately, it is not clear that rules on their
own are sufficient.24 Thus it is time to reconsider the changes
made in the 1990s, which allowed banks to engage in nonmonetary activities (and non-banks to engage in monetary activities).25 The appropriate regime for one set of activities may
be incompatible with the appropriate regime for the other. Indeed, if we do not act soon we may find ourselves with a post23

See discussion infra section III.A.3
See discussion infra subpart III.D.
25
See generally MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016) (examining the modern monetary and banking system, and recommending changes).
24
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crisis legal structure in banking that, in certain key respects, is
not much different from the one we had in 2008.
I
BEYOND RULES V. STANDARDS
As in other areas of law, the distinction between rules and
standards provides a useful starting point for thinking about
the tools available to policymakers in banking.26 But this dichotomy alone suggests that, methodologically, banking law
has not changed much in the last 150 years. After all, both
rules and standards have been in place since the mid-nineteenth century, and government supervision has been part of
banking for just as long. To better illuminate why and how
supervisory policy has changed over the past three decades,
this Part defines a set of terms for parsing the evolution of
banking law, distinguishing between two ways of writing rules
and two ways of enforcing standards. As I will ultimately argue, RFS—a new way of interpreting an old standard—was
designed to accompany risk-based capital requirements—a
new way of writing rules.
A.

Rules and Standards

I define a standard as an obligation or prohibition governing conduct, for which compliance is assessed through an
inter-subjective inquiry. I define a rule as an obligation or prohibition governing conduct, for which compliance is assessed
through an objective inquiry.27 As I am using the words, something is inter-subjective, if, to interpret it, we must rely on
shared understandings, values, and norms.28 Something is
objective, by contrast, if we expect any two people to reach
26
See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258–59 (1974); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–89 (1976);
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577–80
(1988); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 559–63 (1992); Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV.
953, 957–59 (1995); Kathleen Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 23–24 (1992).
27
The literature typically defines standards as general requirements that
must be tailored ex post to specific cases and rules as bright-line requirements
developed in advance of actual application. See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the
Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 161 (1995). But all
laws must be interpreted ex post: the true difference between rules and standards
lies in the type of inquiry that is meant to be conducted when the law is applied.
28
¨
See, e.g., JURGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 13–14 (1996) (elaborating on the concept of inter-subjectivity).
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similar conclusions about it regardless of their perspectives or
experiences. A rule, then, distinguishes between permissible
and impermissible conduct in a way that allows us to be relatively certain of our obligations in advance, because it at least
purports to offer an objective test for compliance. “Be home by
eight” is a rule. “Don’t stay out too late” is a standard.
Objectivity, of course, comes in degrees; we can never transcend background context and shared understandings entirely. (Where is “home”? When is “eight”?) An inquiry can be
more objective or less objective. If objectivity is valued, as it is
with rules, we prefer an inquiry that is more objective. Since a
rule specifies conduct in a way that permits as objective an
inquiry into compliance as practicable, a rule is really a type of
standard.29
Importantly, a standard does not allow for subjective interpretation—which would entail each person determining the
standard’s meaning for his or her self. Instead, a standard
references a set of shared understandings between a group of
people. Thus, when a person interprets a standard, he or she
must inquire into these shared understandings, reflect on
them, and apply them to a specific situation.30
Ontologically, standards precede rules because rules are
attempts to further the shared goals reflected in our inter-subjective understandings.31 Consider the obligation to act in
good faith. We can write down rules articulating what that
duty means in specific cases. Or we can enforce it, articulating
what it means after the fact, in effect turning a specific set of
circumstances into a rule through adjudication.
The paradigmatic example of rules versus standards is automobile regulation, which relies on both rules and standards
to promote public safety on the road.32 The speed limit is a
rule; the prohibition on “reckless driving” is a standard. Speeding is reckless but so is certain behavior that complies with the
speed limit such as driving fast in a downpour, on an icy road,
29
But see Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25
(1967) (arguing that rules are logically distinct because they are “applicable in an
all-or-nothing fashion”).
30
A standard that can be interpreted independently from shared understandings is sometimes known as a “black hole” or a “gray hole.” See Adrian
Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096
(2009).
31
See Habermas, supra note 28, at 13–14.
32
See e.g., Kaplow supra note 26, at 560; Sunstein, supra note 26, at 959;
Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 26, at 257. One wonders why scholars use as their
canonical example of rules a case in which rule breaking is so widespread and
expected.
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or in heavy traffic. The concept of reckless driving cannot be
fully translated into rules. There are too many ways in which
driving can be reckless, too many possible scenarios to consider. Thus, policymakers often employ both rules and standards because it is too difficult, perhaps impossible, to
anticipate and adequately address the wide diversity and variability of potential real-world situations in advance.33
Notwithstanding these limitations, rules are appealing because they increase individual freedom by putting people on
notice about precisely what conduct is permitted and what
conduct is prohibited. Rules are easier to comply with than
standards and easier to enforce. Moreover, a standard-based
regime requires adjudicatory discretion, which creates uncertainty about what will be permitted and what will be prohibited.
Thus, as a matter of legal design, we should adopt standards in
situations where discretion is necessary or even beneficial, and
we should write rules in situations where discretion is unnecessary or even harmful.
B.

Bans and Formulas

A problem with previous incarnations of the rules versus
standards debate is that it fails to compare the different ways
policymakers can write rules with the different ways they can
enforce standards. Policymakers can write rules that are simple and broad, for which it is easy to assess compliance, and
policymakers can write rules that are complex and tailored, for
which it is technically difficult to assess compliance.34 The
first type of rule I call a ban and the second type of rule I call a
formula.35 As defined earlier, a ban is a type of rule that inten33
Aristotle may have been the first to identify this problem, observing that it
is impossible to write rules to cover all cases. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk.
V, at 98 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press rev. ed. 2014) (c. 330
B.C.E.) (“[A]ll law is universal, and there are some things about which one cannot
speak correctly in universal terms.”).
34
There are a few authors who have discussed the complexity of rules, most
significantly Louis Kaplow. See Kaplow, supra note 26 at 151–52, 161. See also
Prasad Krishnamurthy, Rules, Standards, and Complexity in Capital Regulation,
43 J. LEG. STUD. 273 (2014) (examining choice of rules and standards in the
context of bank capital regulation). Unlike these authors, I see bans and formulas
as more than just “more complex” and “less complex” rules. Rather than situate
bans and formulas on one side and standards on another, I see standards occupying a middle ground between the two in certain key respects.
35
Cass Sunstein hints at this distinction, although he does not elaborate on
it, in observing that “rules may be simple or complex” and that you might even
write “a formula for deciding who may drive.” See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 962
(emphasis omitted). Sunstein suggests that such a formula “might look, for example, to age, performance on a written examination, and performance on a
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tionally and prophylactically restricts an easily distinguishable
category of activity, providing a high level of clarity about what
is permitted and what is not permitted, both for regulators and
regulated entities. A formula is a type of rule that delineates an
intricate series of permissible and impermissible aspects of an
activity in advance.36
As with the distinction between rules and standards, this
distinction between formulas and bans is one of family resemblances and not categorical separateness.37 Some rules are
more ban-like (e.g., a sign that says, “road closed,”) and some
more formula-like (e.g., a sign that says, “permit required for
winter driving: weekdays only, between dawn and dusk, if there
is no accumulated snow.”). Rules governing banking include
broad activity restrictions akin to bans as well as narrowly
tailored formulas that attempt to influence the conduct of an
activity as opposed to eliminate it. For example, banks are not
allowed to own equity in other businesses (the separation of
banking and commerce, a ban).38 But banks can extend a
variety of credits to other businesses, provided that they limit
their own overall leverage (risk-based capital requirements, a
formula).39
Formulas are designed to allow much more activity than
bans. If we believe that driving on a road is a social ill at any
driving test. Each of these three variables might be given a specified numerical
weight.” Id. My definition of a formula is roughly synonymous with Sunstein’s,
but not identical, since the factors he lists are not all “rules” in my framework. I
would characterize a driving test and potentially a written exam as forms of
substantive oversight.
36
There is some similarity between the distinction that I make between formulas and bans and the distinctions that economists make between price and
quantity regulation. See generally, Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41
REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974) (differentiating between regulating a harmful activity
by calculating the right price for the harm and imposing a tax and restricting the
quantity of the harmful activity and allowing the market to find its own price). See
also Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Bank of Eng., Remarks at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City’s Economic Policy Symposium: The Dog and the Frisbee 18
(Aug. 31, 2012) (transcript available at https://www.bis.org/review/r120905a
.pdf) [https://perma.cc/L4JV-4GCW] (noting that in the context of banking regulation, regulators have pursued price over quantity-based regulation).
37
See generally, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, 32 (1953)
(examining the idea of “family resemblances” or “family likenesses”).
38
See Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24, 78, 377–78 (2018); Bank Holding
Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2018).
39
There are hard cases. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act includes a prohibition on proprietary trading, the Volcker Rule, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851, a ban.
But the hundreds of pages of rules that the banking agencies have written distinguishing between proprietary trading and permissible trading are formulas. Accordingly, since proprietary trading is not an easily distinguished category of
activity, Dodd-Frank’s ban on it appears to have morphed into a formula.
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time of the day, then a ban is intuitively appealing. But if we
think that there are times when driving on the road might bring
about a social benefit, or if we believe that people should be
allowed to make that choice for themselves under certain circumstances, then we might find a ban excessively restrictive
and write a rule that more closely reflects our intuitions. Closing a potentially dangerous road, for example, may inconvenience a lot of people. A more permissive formula, however,
may be hard to develop, follow, and enforce. Troublingly, a
formula may fail to capture harmful activity that we want to
prohibit. With a ban, what behavior is permitted and what
behavior is proscribed is immediately clear, simplifying the
task of those who must comply with the rule. When choosing
between bans and formulas, we must weigh the increased use
of the road, for example, against the likelihood that more people will drive in dangerous conditions.
Another design issue is the feasibility of writing out a workable, objective decision function that distinguishes between
permissible and impermissible conduct ex ante. Since
formula-writers must delineate, in advance, permissible behavior in different states of the world, they presuppose an ability to
predict those potential states.40 Complexity may make formula
writing difficult. Uncertainty may make it impossible.41 If our
predictions are unlikely to be correct, or if our predictions are
likely to alter real-world activity in unforeseeable ways,42 then
we may be better served by a blunter instrument like a ban or
an ex post mechanism like a standard.
C.

Substantive and Procedural Oversight

It is also helpful to distinguish between two ways of enforcing standards like the prohibition on unsafe and unsound
banking practices. As defined earlier, substantive oversight is
40
Often the best response to a complex, highly interconnected system is a
simple rule. Studies have shown that simple rules outperform more complex
approaches in a variety of endeavors from diagnosing heart attacks to predicting
avalanches. See Haldane supra note 36, at 4–5 (citing studies, including Gerd
Gigerenzer & Stephanie Kurzenhauser, Fast and Frugal Heuristics in Medical
Decision Making, in SCIENCE AND MEDICINE IN DIALOGUE: THINKING THROUGH PARTICULARS AND UNIVERSALS (Roger Bilbace et al. eds., 2005) and Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry
Brighton, Homo Heuristics: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences, 1 TOPICS IN
COGNITIVE SCI. 107 (2009)).
41
See generally FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT ch. VII (1921)
(explaining the difference between “risk” and “uncertainty”).
42
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial
Regulation, J. LEG. STUD. at 2–4 (2014) (suggesting that new rules in the financial
sector, a “constructed system,” lead to unpredictable results).
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the assessment of actual outcomes (“what you did”). Procedural oversight is the assessment of “how you did it.” For example, a parent might tell a child to “do a good job on their
homework.” The parent could enforce that standard (“do a
good job”) procedurally, by assessing whether the child spent
enough time working on their homework and answered every
question. Or the parent could enforce that standard substantively, by reading the answers and deciding whether the work
was good. In the banking context, I define something as procedural if it reflects the bank’s wholly internal activities (governance, auditing, risk management) and substantive if it involves
the bank’s outward actions (extending a loan, buying a security, creating a fake account).43
Generally, substantive oversight is much more tightly connected to underlying policy goals because it involves a direct
inquiry into whether the ends we are trying to achieve are being
achieved. Procedural oversight includes an additional inference, which is that when certain processes are followed, certain
ends are achieved.44 There may be many cases where permissible processes are consistent with impermissible intended
outcomes. This is a significant issue in banking, where different risk appetites can be consistent with the same internal
procedures for identifying and assuming risks.
Nonetheless, to oversee substantively, a supervisor must
be able to assess the substance. And it helps if the supervisor
can assess the substance at least as well as the subject can.
Returning to the previous example, it might be difficult for
parents to assess their children’s homework in a foreign language class. But a parent may still be able to check that their
child answered every question and spent time working on the
assignment. For one, this form of oversight may require less
effort; it is easier to check for answers than it is to check the
answers themselves. For another, it may be less contentious to
monitor acceptable procedures than to repeatedly contest acceptable outcomes through ex post lawmaking. Returning to
43
This dichotomy is not always meaningful. But for lawmaking targeted at
groups, it is a useful distinction as outcomes are typically the result of many
people working together.
44
An example of this in corporate law is the tendency of courts to police “fair
process” when determining “fair price.” See Jason Halper, Fair Price and Process
in Delaware Appraisals, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. AND FIN. REG. (Nov. 6,
2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/11/06/fair-price-and-process-indelaware-appraisals [https://perma.cc/H35L-TJ9L] (noting that Delaware courts
use “merger price (following an arm’s length, thorough and informed sales process)” to determine fair value).
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banking, a supervisor taking a procedural approach, rather
than assessing the level of risk in a loan or trade, might look at
whether internal control functions were involved in the decision to make that loan or trade and if the loan or trade was
consistent with the bank’s own stated investment policies.
There are other practical reasons why government actors
might choose not to enforce a standard substantively. As a
matter of legal design, the choice between prohibiting an activity (bans), permitting an activity but differentiating between
permissible and impermissible variants ex post (substantive
oversight), and permitting an activity and differentiating between permissible and impermissible variants ex ante (formulas), is complicated by the fact that banks will challenge the
legal regime, especially to achieve higher levels of risk and
therefore higher returns. Accordingly, external industry pressure will affect which tools the government adopts and whether
those tools work. It is in this context that procedural oversight,
which does not appear to be a first-best solution, emerges as a
dominant strategy. The next Part considers how some of these
dynamics affected the evolution of supervisory policy in
banking.
II
THE DECLINE OF DISCRETIONARY OVERSIGHT
Using the taxonomy developed in Part I, this Part tries to
make sense of how banking law has changed over the last three
decades. It traces a shift in the 1980s and 1990s from a system in which banks were restricted to core monetary activities
by bans, and overseen substantively by state actors, to a system in which banks were allowed to grow into large financial
conglomerates, and the responsibility for their oversight was
transferred from state actors to the market. This latter regime,
still in place today, is governed by complex formulas designed
to ensure that the market appropriately disciplines bank executives. Supervisors are primarily deployed to police banks’ internal processes as a means to further facilitate such market
discipline.
A.

Supervisory Policy in the Quiet Period

For a period of nearly fifty years, rules, in the form of strict
structural bans, limited the scale and scope of banks, and
other ban-like provisions limited the rates banks could charge
borrowers and pay depositors. Rules did not, however, regulate day-to-day banking activity. Instead, supervisors, exercis-
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ing discretion, assessed the safety and soundness of banks’
balance sheets and business practices. Below, I (1) sketch out
this traditional approach to bank supervision and (2) explicate
the role of bans in facilitating it.
1.

Safety and Soundness Oversight

The fount of supervisory authority in the U.S. is a statutory
standard prohibiting banks from engaging in “unsafe and unsound” practices. This prohibition was first codified in 1847 in
New York and was subsequently adopted by over a dozen
states.45 For these early legislatures, the standard was a tool
through which the government could fulfill its obligation to
establish a stable and efficient monetary system: one in which
each banking institution was sound (i.e., solvent) so that the
public’s money supply would be safe. When supervisors identified practices that they considered “unsafe and unsound,” they
could take a variety of remedial actions, including removing a
bank’s officers and directors or revoking its license to issue
deposits.
Early legislatures also endowed supervisors with another
significant power—visitation—which has an even more ancient
pedigree. Visitation derives from the right of the sovereign to
enter unannounced, uninvited, and unexpected to examine the
affairs of legal entities that it constitutes.46 Visitation allows
the state to protect its interests whenever such an entity is
“abusing the power given it” or “acting adversely to the public,
or creating a nuisance.”47 As the Supreme Court put it, visitation provides a “right to oversee corporate affairs, quite separate from the [general] power to enforce the law.”48 When
Congress established the OCC in 1864, it granted the agency
the exclusive right of visitation over banks it chartered.49 (Previously, U.S. banks were chartered only by state governments,

45
My research suggests that the phrase first entered the statute books in
close to its current form in New York in 1847. Act of Dec. 4, 1847, ch. 419, Laws
1847, 519, reprinted in THE BANKING SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1864)
(empowering the state comptroller to “examine” the “books, papers and affairs”
and produce and publish a report on any bank that “in the opinion of the comptroller,” is “in an unsound or unsafe condition to do banking business”).
46
See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n., 557 U.S. 519, 526 (2009).
47
Horace L. Wilgus, Private Corporations, in AMERICAN LAW AND PROCEDURE 81,
224–25 (James Parker Hall & James DeWitt Andrews, eds., 1910).
48
See Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 526.
49
Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 1864 Stat. 100 (establishing the OCC).
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often directly by state legislatures, and those governments conferred similar powers to their examiners.)50
For most of U.S. history, safety and soundness and visitation powers were relatively unremarkable as banks were understood to be monetary institutions engaged in the critical
work of creating money and facilitating payments, functions
which they performed on behalf of the state, whose ultimate
obligation it was to provide a viable currency.51 Supervisors, as
agents of the state, policed the activities of these franchisees,
ensuring that their efforts served the public interest.52
The California Supreme Court eloquently described this
system in State Savings & Commercial Bank v. Anderson,53
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. According to the court,
there was “nothing novel in the legislation,” which allowed the
superintendent to put banks into receivership “[w]henever [he]
shall have reason to conclude that any bank is in an unsound
or unsafe condition to transact the business for which it is
organized.”54 Banks, the court argued, performed functions
“essentially of a public nature.”55 “The capital which [the bank
shareholder] has invested and the returns which he receives
upon it are insignificant in importance relative to the advantages which society at large derives from the conduct of the
banking business.”56 Indeed, “the evil consequences of unsound banking are distributed between the banker and the
general public in like proportion.”57 Thus, the court explained,
50
See Christine E. Blair & Rose M. Kushmeider, Challenges to the Dual
Banking System: The Funding of Bank Supervision, 18 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.
BANKING REV. 1, 2 (2006). The First and Second Banks of the United States are the
two exceptions to this: the federal government chartered them. See generally
JOHN JAY KNOX, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES (1900) (surveying the
early history of American banking).
51
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 (“to coin money [and] regulate the value thereof”). See
also MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1867–1960 (1963) (conceptualizing banks as monetary institutions); MILTON FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY 8 (1960) (“Something
like a moderately stable monetary framework seems an essential prerequisite for
the effective operation of a private market economy. It is dubious that the market
can by itself provide such a framework. Hence, the function of providing one is an
essential government function on par with the provision of a stable legal
framework.”).
52
See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1147–49 (2017).
53
State Sav. & Commercial Bank v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 437 (Cal. 1913) aff’d
per curiam, 238 U.S. 611 (1915).
54
Id. at 439.
55
Id. at 442.
56
Id.
57
Id. “Such legislation adopted so generally has come as the result of years of
observation of the intimate relation of banking with the business world, the disas-
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it was “well-settled doctrine that the business of banking is a
proper subject of legislative control by the state in the exercise
of what is known as the police power.”58
Bank supervision, then, was originally conceived of as a
legal tool for ensuring a stable and efficient monetary system.
Banks were vital nodes in that system and carried out essential
functions in exchange for certain special privileges. When
banks failed, the consequences were severe. Accordingly, in
the aftermath of the worst monetary system collapse in American history, the Great Depression, Congress expanded the
powers of national supervisory authorities by importing state
safety and soundness law into the federal code, granting new
authority to the Fed,59 the FDIC,60 and the OCC.
Today, safety and soundness appears in over a dozen
places in the federal code. The primary provision is in the
Federal Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966,
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818, which reads:
If, in the opinion of the appropriate Federal banking agency
[any covered bank] . . . is engaging or has engaged, or the
agency has reasonable cause to believe . . . is about to engage, in an unsafe or unsound practice . . . the appropriate
Federal banking agency . . . may issue and serve upon [the
bank] a notice of charges.61

Thereafter, the agency may pursue a range of actions including
terminating the bank’s deposit insurance, ordering the bank to
cease and desist from any unsafe or unsound practice, or removing one or more of the bank’s officers and directors.62
According to Congress:
The concept of ‘unsafe or unsound practices’ is one of general
application which touches upon the entire field of the operations of a financial institution. For this reason, it would be
virtually impossible to attempt to catalog within a single allinclusive or rigid definition the broad spectrum of activities
which are embraced by the term. The formulation of such a
definition would probably operate to exclude those practices
not set out in the definition, even though they might be
trous consequences of unsound banking and the necessity for prompt measures
for the protection of the public therefrom.” Id. at 446.
58
Id. at 441.
59
Emergency Banking Act, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1 (March 9, 1933).
60
Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A
History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 524 (1971).
61
See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1).
62
See id. at (a)-(e); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5)(H); see also Thomas L. Holzman,
Unsafe or Unsound Practices: Is the Current Judicial Interpretation of the Term
Unsafe or Unsound?, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 425, 428 (2000).
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highly injurious to an institution under a given set of facts or
circumstances or a scheme developed by unscrupulous operators to avoid the reach of the law. . . . [A] particular activity
not necessarily unsafe or unsound in every instance may be
so when considered in the light of all relevant facts. Thus,
what may be an acceptable practice for an institution with a
strong reserve position, such as concentration in higher risk
lending, may well be unsafe or unsound for a marginal
operation.63

The point of the standard, in other words, is to allow the
government to make case-by-case judgments about bank investments and activities. To that end, supervisors traditionally
interpreted it both substantively and procedurally. The OCC
acted to address, for example, the “accumulation of certain
unsafe assets in an amount constituting 37% of the Bank’s
gross capital funds” or a “failure to implement adequate internal controls and auditing procedures.”64 Supervisors forced
banks to claw back compensation, when they saw “payment of
excessive bonuses to Bank officers” or “payment of excessive
salaries to Bank officers.”65 Supervisors also used their “removal and prohibition”66 power to ban dishonest individuals,
one of the earliest goals of safety and soundness law.67 This
remedy reflects the government’s longstanding concern with
the reputability and trustworthiness of the banking business,
considerations that transcend the confines of an individual institution’s solvency.68
63
Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966: Hearings on
S. 3158 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong. 49 (1966).
64
First Nat. Bank of Eden v. Dep’t of Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 n.1 (8th
Cir. 1978).
65
Id.
66
12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (“Removal and prohibition authority”).
67
See, e.g., Act of February 24, 1845, ch. 299, 1845 Ohio Laws 776 (1846).
68
See generally, Governance and Culture Reform, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
NEW YORK, https://www.newyorkfed.org/governance-and-culture-reform [https:/
/perma.cc/2YNX-FB95] (collection of articles and speeches on governance and
banking reforms); Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Can., Remarks at the 7th
Annual Thomas d’Aquino Lecture of Leadership: Rebuilding Trust in Global Banking (Feb. 25, 2013) (transcript available at https://www.bis.org/review/
r130226c.pdf) [https://perma.cc/T5FK-Y23K] (discussing the importance of trust
in the financial system and the reforms needed to restore it); William Dudley,
President and Chief Exec. Officer of the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the
Global Economic Policy Forum: Ending Too Big to Fail (Nov. 7, 2013) (transcript
available at https://www.bis.org/review/e131108g.pdf) [https://perma.cc/
UP4E-BGH] (noting “the apparent lack of respect for law, regulation and the
public trust” and “evidence of deep-seated cultural and ethical failures at many
large financial institutions” and calling it “another critical problem that needs to
be addressed”); Mark Carney, Financial Stability Board Chair’s Letter to G20
Leaders: Building a Resilient and Open Global Financial System to Support Sus-
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Modern safety and soundness law also allows supervisors
to require banks to correct specific deficiencies—oversight that
demands judgment and discretion. “To be effective,” one Fed
official explained, a supervisor “must scrupulously avoid imposing conditions ‘too quickly and too great,’ but he must be
even more alert to avoid committing the unpardonable sin of
bank supervision of doing ‘too little, too late.’ ”69 Take asset
quality, for example. In a bank where it appears to be deteriorating, supervisors must “try to determine whether there had
been a weakening in the loan servicing procedures or in the
bank’s basic lending policies.”70 If supervisors found “a noticeable increase” in problem loans, they might issue “a transmittal
letter urging the directors to review the bank’s lending policies
and to take such action as is necessary to obtain additional
security for weak loans, reductions or definite repayment
programs.”71
During the Quiet Period, these judgments were made in a
systematized manner, through a regime of periodic on-site examinations, by OCC staff in the case of nationally chartered
banks, and Fed staff in the case of holding companies and state
member banks.72 Starting in the 1970s, the OCC developed a
ratings system called CAMELS, which quantified key supervisory judgments regarding capital adequacy, asset quality,
management, earnings, liquidity, and interest rate sensitivity.73 Banks with persistent problems or major weaknesses
along these dimensions were subject to enforcement actions.
For example, in 1980, the OCC brought an action against a
large bank “experiencing unsatisfactory earnings performance,” which the agency noted was leading the bank’s equity to
become “strained.”74 Supervisors ordered the bank to improve
its asset quality, reconstitute its management committee, and
submit a plan to improve its capital position.75
tainable Cross-Border Investment (Aug. 30, 2016) (stating that “financial sector
misconduct has risen to a level that has the potential to create systemic risks by
undermining trust in both financial institutions and markets”).
69
Orville O. Wyrick, The General Nature of Bank Supervision, in FED. RESERVE
BANK OF ST. LOUIS, BANK SUPERVISION 5 (1963).
70
See Wilbur H. Isbell, Review and Appraisal, in FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST.
LOUIS, BANK SUPERVISION 29 (1963) (chief examiner of the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis).
71
Id. at 31.
72
Id. at 27.
73
The “management” dimension encompasses many quintessentially procedural concerns such as governance and internal controls.
74
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 132 (1980)
(including three cases of substantive oversight for the largest banks).
75
Id.

2018]

TOO BIG TO SUPERVISE

1547

Senior officials also used their discretionary authority to
address risks to the larger system. They were attuned, for example, to regulatory arbitrage, and the spread of banking activity outside of banks. For example, in 1980, Fed chairman Paul
Volcker was concerned about banks manipulating “certain
Euro-dollar transactions to reduce reserve requirements artificially.”76 Though no law or regulation “prohibited the practice,” it distorted “the international payments system and
competitive relationships.”77 The Fed resolved the problem,
Volcker tells us, by asking “the few banks engaging in the practice to cease.”78
Quiet Period oversight was predicated on a shared understanding that the state was a partner in the business of banking and that, to achieve its goals, the state had to have the
flexibility and discretion to intervene in a bank’s operations on
a case-by-case basis. Banks were not like other businesses, for
which competition and bankruptcy were part of a salutary process of creative destructive and economic growth; they were
institutions that provided vital services to other businesses in
conjunction with the state and its “central” bank. When these
services were disrupted or improperly rendered, the result was
extreme public harm.
2.

The Role of Bans

Rules played a critical role in this regime. Assessing the
underlying riskiness of a loan portfolio or determining whether
a trade hedges risk or amplifies it is hard, especially when it is
in the financial interest of bank management to thwart such
efforts. In the 1930s, Congress substantially alleviated the difficulty of supervision by enacting a series of bans that (a) better
aligned the interests of bank managers with the interests of
other stakeholders (weakening incentives for excessive risktaking) and (b) reduced the complexity of banking so that it was
easier to monitor and risk-taking was easier to measure.
a.

Activity Bans

Activity bans, the lynchpin of the Quiet Period regime, restricted banks to banking: issuing monetary instruments, fa76
Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Bankers Association: The
Burden of Banking Regulation 12 (Oct. 14, 1980) (transcript available at https://
fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/451/item/8226).
77
Id.
78
Id.
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cilitating payments, and extending high-quality credit assets.
Given the innate funding advantages of banks (they can, within
limits, create money),79 governments have typically found activity restrictions necessary to prevent the undue concentration of economic power.80 These restrictions, however, also
serve to prophylactically prevent banks from pursuing highrisk ventures that do not further the monetary aims for which
banks receive their special legal privileges and government financial backing.
To that end, U.S. banks have always been prohibited from
engaging in non-banking business, a policy known as the separation of banking and commerce.81 In the Banking Act of
1933,82 Congress expanded the prohibition to cover certain
other financial activities as well, specifically dealing in nongovernment securities,83 underwriting or distributing non-government securities,84 investing in non-investment grade securities for their own account,85 and affiliating with companies
that engage in such activities.86 Congress also prohibited nonbanks from engaging in banking activities. The purpose of
these new restrictions (known as “Glass-Steagall”), according
to Congress, was “[t]o provide for the safer and more effective
use of the assets of banks, to regulate interbank control, [and]
to prevent the undue diversion of funds into speculative
operations[.]”87
79
John Maynard Keynes explained this phenomenon as such: “It is certainly
not the case that the banks are limited to that kind of deposit, for the creation of
which it is necessary that depositors should come on their own initiative bringing
cash or cheques. But it is equally clear that the rate at which an individual bank
creates deposits on its own initiative [through extending loans and crediting accounts] is subject to certain rules and limitations;—it must keep step with the
other banks and cannot raise its own deposits relatively to the total deposits out of
proportion to its quota of the banking business of the country.” JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, TREATISE ON MONEY 23–30 (1930).
80
See Charles F. Dunbar, The Bank of Venice, 6 Q. J. ECON. 308, 314 (1892)
(detailing fourteenth century Venetian restrictions on dealing in commodities).
81
See Bernard Shull, The Separation of Banking and Commerce in the United
States: An Examination of Principal Issues 4 (OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, Economics Working Paper No. 1999–1). These sorts of restrictions
were not codified by statute but placed in banking charters granted by the states
and later by the federal government.
82
Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
83
Id. at § 20.
84
Id. at § 21.
85
Id. at § 16.
86
Id. at § 32. Before the 1929 crash, the OCC had the “duty of determining
what types of securities were eligible for bank affiliates to underwrite.” Perkins,
supra note 60, at 494 n.27.
87
See Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (discussing the purpose
of the Act).
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Glass-Steagall was simple and broad, easy to enforce and
hard to dodge, politically salient and durable.88 One way to
conceptualize the Act is as a loan covenant: in exchange for
backstopping banks, the government required them to refrain
from risky, hard-to-monitor activities, much as a lender to an
oil company might include a moratorium on new drilling. Although such a covenant might prevent low-risk exploratory
drilling projects, given monitoring and transaction costs, it may
still be efficient ex ante. Because underwriting and trading
securities do not advance monetary goals, policymakers decided that these services should be provided instead by private
businesses free to compete and fail without harm to the monetary system.
b.

Scale and Scope Bans

Scale and scope restrictions were also longstanding features of banking law. They ensured that banks were distributed across the country so that every city and town had access
to the payments network and to monetary instruments (bank
notes and deposits). A byproduct of these provisions was that
individual firms were much easier to oversee. For example,
nationally chartered banks were restricted by statute from
opening branches across state lines.89 Even within states,
branching was highly restricted by state legislatures, reducing
the systemic footprint and political influence of banks.90
Banks, therefore, were closely tied to local regions; their employees were generally part of one institution for their entire
careers; and their executives often composed a significant percentage of the liability side of their balance sheets. Further,
states had a significant stake in the fate of the banks head-

88
See generally, HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY BANK REGULATION FAILED: DESIGNING A
BANK REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S, 36–37 (1991) (discussing the GlassSteagall regime).
89
See McFadden Act, Pub. L. No. 639, 69th Congress, H.R. 2 (1927).
90
The Act had a variety of unintended risk-reducing effects. Generally, it
allowed national banks to branch to the extent permitted by their home states,
which meant little branching into other states. Though the law was meant to
protect community banks, it also improved profitability and reduced the systemic
importance of individual banks.
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quartered in their jurisdictions.91 These structural provisions
aligned the interests of banks with the interests of the public.92
c.

Competition Bans

Because banks were monetary institutions, it did not make
sense for them to compete on the pricing of money itself—the
provision of money was a public good. Regulation Q, promulgated under the Banking Act of 1933, reduced bank risk-taking
by establishing interest rate caps for savings accounts and
prohibiting interest payments on checking accounts.93 These
restrictions prevented banks from luring deposits away from
other banks by offering their customers a higher price. Thus,
banks were not pressured to competitively reduce their lending
standards to earn higher interest income (to afford higher interest expense). Such pressures might prompt a vicious cycle,
in which individual banks weaken themselves and other banks
simultaneously (banks were free, however, to compete on lending quality). Congress also restricted entry into banking, limiting the number of entities with access to deposit issuance, the
payments network, and emergency lending facilities.94
Taken together, bans on activities, scale and scope, and
competition, reduced the ability of, and the incentive for, bankers to take excessive risk. The law made it hard for banks to
pursue high-risk balance sheet strategies by prohibiting banks
from trading securities, affiliating with non-banks, and devel91
Until 1978, national banks could not “export” regulations in their home
state to their business in other states, averting a regulatory race-to-the-bottom.
See Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978)
(holding that state usury laws cannot be enforced against national banks
chartered in other states). See generally, Steven Mercatane, The Deregulation of
Usury Ceilings, Rise of Easy Credit, and Increasing Consumer Debt, 53 S.D.L. REV.
37 (2008) (exploring the negative symbiotic relationship between deregulated
usury ceilings and consumer debt).
92
There were downsides to this fragmented system. Banks had little geographical diversity in their loan portfolios and deposit bases, which increased the
likelihood of insolvency during regional downturns. In addition, small banks
could not fully leverage their fixed costs for basic administrative functions. Nonetheless, the arrangement was politically durable: every congressional district had
a bank, an influential constituent, and these banks knew that the McFadden Act
restrictions favored them. Small banks feared that they would be driven out of
business by big banks if the restrictions were lifted, binding their political coalition together for generations.
93
See 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1933).
94
See generally, The National Bank Act, ch. 58 § 10, 12 Stat. 665 (1863)
(empowering the comptroller of the currency to charter banks); Federal Reserve
Act of 1913, Pub. L. 63-43, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, et seq. §§ 221-522 (establishing
the Federal Reserve System, the discount window, and the member banking network); Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (establishing the FDIC and the system of
deposit insurance).
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oping large conglomerates that might enjoy too-big-to-fail subsidies. And the law made it easy for banks to collect a steady
stream of rents without pursuing high-risk strategies by limiting competition, restricting entry, capping interest expense,
and reducing interstate branching.95 The law also restricted
banks to a core set of critical activities, which supervisors
could easily understand and evaluate.
While it is difficult to calculate the costs of this ban and
supervision-intensive era, the benefits are easy to estimate:
there were no major bank failures or panics in the U.S. between
1935 and 1980—the longest period of financial stability in
American history.96 Based on the historical incidence of bank
panics in the U.S., we might have expected two 2008-magnitude calamities during this time.97
B.

Supervisory Policy in the Deregulatory Era

Despite the stability generated by the “old regime”—and,
perhaps, in part, because of it—it began to unravel in the
1980s. A new generation of policymakers came to Washington,
dominated by Ph.D. economists like Alan Greenspan and Laurence Meyer, and former Wall Street executives like Robert
Rubin. These officials had a different view of banks and the
role of government in banking.98 They believed that the Depression-era laws were excessively blunt instruments that repressed efficient economic activity.99 They favored the
95
See Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank
Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 508–09 (1989). In any
system of bans, the more profitable the activity prohibited, the greater the incentive for avoidance. One of the easiest ways to skirt bans is to innovate corporate
form, i.e., to figure out how to do the same business (issue deposits, make loans)
without being subject to regulation.
96
The first bank failure to draw significantly from the FDIC insurance fund
was the collapse of Penn Square Bank in 1982 (the cause was largely risky oil and
gas loans). See Jeff Gerth, Penn Square’s Insider Dealing, N.Y. TIMES (1982),
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/14/business/penn-square-s-insider-dealing.html [https://perma.cc/K4MM-TAGL]. Franklin National Bank failed in 1974
due mainly to fraud and self-dealing. See John H. Allan, Franklin Found Insolvent
by U.S. and Taken Over, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 1974), https://www.nytimes.com/
1974/10/09/archives/franklin-found-insolvent-by-us-and-taken-over-european-group-in.html [https://perma.cc/7Z6E-L6UP].
97
See Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Recovery from Financial
Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes, 104 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
50 (2014).
98
See Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives
Changed the “Business of Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1044–46 (2009).
99
Greenspan, for example, called the regulatory regime an “outdated competitive straightjacket” and reiterated frequently that banks were subject to an “overregulated and over-restrained structure.” Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks to 28th Annual Conference on Bank
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conglomeration, diversification, and expansion of banks into
other intermediation activities, to enhance banks’ stability, increase their profitability, and reduce their earnings volatility.
They thought that stronger, bigger banks would spur faster
and broader economic growth. They were also internationalists, who sought to build powerful American firms to compete
with heavily concentrated financial sectors in Europe and
Asia.100 Instead of focusing on protecting bank creditors, like
their predecessors had, these men sought to empower bank
shareholders. Shareholders, they believed, were the best
judges of how to run banks, and, unhampered, could accelerate economic growth and enhance social welfare.101
First, they worked to change the structural law to allow
banks to grow into multi-purpose financial conglomerates.102
Then they changed the way the banking agencies supervised
and regulated these firms. Some of these policymakers, like
Greenspan, Meyer, and Rubin, believed that market discipline
could moderate risk-taking and largely replace government
oversight.103 Others, like Gene Ludwig, conceded the need for
government oversight, but believed that technocrats could libStructure and Competition: Putting FDICIA in Perspective 7, 10 (May 7, 1992)
(transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/?item_id=8473&file
path=/files/docs/historical/greenspan/Greenspan_19920507.pdf) [https://
perma.cc/Y7GS-VMZQ].
100
Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Exchequer Club (Jan. 24, 1996) (transcript available at https://www.occ.treas.gov/
news-issuances/news-releases/1996/nr-occ-1996-8.html) [https://perma.cc/
PP8F-XS8T] (noting these reforms were critical to “helping the American economy
compete internationally”).
101
See Garten, supra note 95, at 505–06.
102
See Saule T. Omarova, Central Banks, Systemic Risk and Financial Sector
Structural Reform, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CENTRAL BANKING 3 (Rosa Lastra &
Peter Conti-Brown eds., 2018); John C. Coates IV, The Volcker Rule as Structural
Law: Implications for Cost-Benefit Analysis and Administrative Law, 10 CAP. MKTS.
L.J. 447, 448 (2015) (defining structural law as an attempt to “organize, constrain
and channel activity”).
103
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks to the American Bankers Association: The Evolution of Bank Supervision 2 (Oct. 11, 1999) (transcript available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/1999/19991011.htm) [https://perma.cc/F69Y-4Y3E]
[hereinafter Evolution of Bank Supervision] (noting that “supervisors have little
choice but to try to rely more—not less—on market discipline—augmented by
more effective public disclosures—to carry an increasing share of the oversight
load”); Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks to the International Conference of Banking Supervisors: Bank Supervision in a World Economy 12 (Jun. 13, 1996) (transcript available at https://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19960613.htm) [https://
perma.cc/9MWJ-DUBF] (noting that “the technology that has enabled institutions to design complex new products also provides the techniques with which the
resulting risks can be identified, measured, and controlled”).
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eralize banking law by fine-tuning regulation and limiting supervisory discretion. Nearly all policymakers believed that
innovative technological breakthroughs like value-at-risk modeling and credit derivatives made banking more stable and rendered parts of the old regime obsolete.104 The new legal
ordering these policymakers established was unlike any that
had come before it—with a different design and a different set
of guiding principles.
1.

Dismantling Bans

As with many ideological reorientations, the deregulatory
movement had a very tangible and material catalyst: economic
stagnation. Over the course of the 1970s, inflation soared;
unemployment climbed to nearly 10%, and GDP growth plummeted. As a new decade dawned, the economy fell into recession. Given relatively “high” levels of financial stability and
“low” levels of economic performance, the government traded a
bit of the former to boost the latter. First, Congress repealed
Regulation Q, allowing depository institutions to raid each
other’s deposits.105 This policy spurred competition between
banks. It also led to competition between banks and thrifts—
non-banks permitted to sell savings accounts and residential
mortgages. Then, to help constituents buy homes,106 Congress
exempted thrifts from restrictions on interest expense, interstate branching, and non-banking activities, and allowed them
to make commercial loans and issue checkable deposits.
Thrifts boomed.107

104
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks to the Annual Convention of the American Bankers Association (Oct. 5,
1996) (transcript available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/1996/19961005.htm) [https://perma.cc/75UQ-7B9C] (arguing that
better and more quantifiable estimates of risk are tantamount to risk reduction).
105
Regulation Q was phased out over six years beginning in 1980 by the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act. See Pub. L.
96–221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 226).
106
As Volcker noted in 1984: “[T]he public policy rationale for the favorable
regulatory, tax, and credit treatment of thrift institutions is fundamentally rooted
in their activity as home lenders.” Statement Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous., & Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 5 (1984) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.) (transcript available at https://
fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/451/item/8288) [https://perma.cc/J4DQ-K6AJ].
107
Assets at thrifts grew from $604 billion in 1980 to $1.35 trillion in 1988.
See DIV. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, FDIC, AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF
THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S, 168–69 (1997) https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical
/history/vol1.html [https://perma.cc/ETV9-LY7W].
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The competition put financial pressure on banks.108
Banks were not pleased. As the banks saw it, thrifts lacked the
strict prudential oversight to which banks were subject, yet
were permitted to conduct similar activities. Seeking alternative sources of revenue, banks stepped up their lobbying in
Washington. Although some adjustments were made,109 prominent policymakers, like Paul Volcker at the Fed, defended the
existing legal regime.
Volcker thought that banks (and thrifts, if they were allowed to conduct banking activities) had a special “fiduciary
responsibility” to the public, which necessitated their close supervision. As trustees of the public’s money, these organizations must, as he put it, invest “prudently while making loans
available competitively, productively, and impartially to all sectors of the economy.”110 Accordingly, Volcker resisted industry
efforts to undermine regulations. At the annual conference of
the American Bankers Association (ABA) in 1983, he derided
the “banking lobbyists scurrying around Washington,” telling
bank executives that “the role of a supervisor,” is not “that of
chief industry cheerleader.”111
To Volcker, the problem was not that banks were too regulated, but that “the non-bank bank has become a device for
tearing down the separation of commerce and banking by permitting a commercial firm to enter the traditional banking business without abiding by the provisions of the Bank Holding
Company Act.”112 “Both thrift and bank regulators,” he told
Congress, “need additional tools to deal with pressing
problems,” as “[p]articular institutions . . . are responding to
the shifting competitive pressures . . . by exploiting loopholes
and inconsistencies . . . in ways that will ultimately threaten
108

See Garten, supra note 95, at 524.
For example, the Fed lowered reserve requirements so that banks could
lend out more of their funds. See Joshua N. Feinman, Reserve Requirements:
History, Current Practice, and Potential Reform, 79 FED. RES. BULL. 569, 581
(1993).
110
Statement Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong. 7 (1987) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys.) (transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/451/
item/8351 [https://perma.cc/9EFF-7CVC]).
111
Paul Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Bankers Association 15 (Oct.
10, 1983) (transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/451/item/
8282 [https://perma.cc/2UTY-BTKX]).
112
Statement Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong. 5 (1987) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys.) (transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/451/
item/8351 [https://perma.cc/9EFF-7CVC]).
109
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the integrity of the whole.”113 Volcker proposed enhanced oversight of thrifts to restore the level playing field. Regulatory
arbitrage, Volcker told Congress, must be “halted before irretrievable damage is done.”114 Needless to say, Volcker’s advice
went unheeded.
In 1987, Greenspan succeeded Volcker as chairman of the
Fed. Greenspan had an entirely different view of banking. To
Greenspan, banks were just like other businesses, except for
the fact that their failure often started panics, which harmed
other banks and businesses. The government safety net, including deposit insurance and liquidity insurance, reduced
these externalities but distorted the market by incentivizing
bankers to make higher-risk loans and increase leverage. Government oversight was necessary not because banks were partners of the state in the creation and circulation of money, but
because banks might try to socialize their losses. If the government’s intervention in the banking business was not highly
tailored—and this point was critical to Greenspan and his followers—it would further distort markets and lead to even worse
outcomes.115 “The self-interest of market participants generates private market regulation,” Greenspan explained. Thus,
“the real question is not whether a market should be regulated.
Rather the real question is whether government intervention
strengthens or weakens private regulation.”116
According to Greenspan, the New Deal regime was of the
weakening variety—a “regulatory straitjacket that stifles innovation and prudent risk management.”117 Since it did much
more harm than good, Greenspan implored Congress to tear it
down. In his view, the growth of the non-bank sector “significantly eroded the ability of the present structure to sustain
competition and safe-and-sound financial institutions in a fair
113

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 4.
115
The fundamental error in Greenspan’s model is his tendency to view banks
as “financial intermediaries” rather than money issuers and credit creators. See
Hockett and Omarova, supra note 52, at 1158.
116
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta: Government Regulation and Derivatives Contracts (Feb. 21, 1997) (transcript available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1997/
19970221.htm)[ https://perma.cc/9LLW-829N].
117
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the 29th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition:
FDICIA and the Future of Banking Law and Regulation 13 (May 6, 1993) (transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/?item_id]=8486&file
path=/files/docs/historical/greenspan/Greenspan_19930506.pdf) [https://
perma.cc/6P3T-A9V7].
114
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and equitable way.”118 It “is essential,” he told Congress, that
the government “put in place a new, more flexible framework.”119 Specifically, he sought the repeal of Glass-Steagall,
which he said depressed the franchise value of banks, reduced
their capital, and raised the costs of financial services.120
But Congress did not listen to Greenspan. The country
was in the midst of its first banking crisis since the Great
Depression. Excessive risk-taking by thrifts—and banks
under competitive pressures from thrifts—prompted 262 FDICinsured institutions to fail or require assistance, the most in
the history of the insurance fund. In September of 1987, the
stock market plummeted nearly 23% in one day. The next
year, another 470 insured depository institutions failed, including 168 thrifts. In 1989, another 534 depository institutions failed, including 275 thrifts. Greenspan, however, stuck
with his message: “[I]n the Board’s view, the single most important step [toward restoring stability] . . . is to repeal . . . GlassSteagall[.]”121 To that end, Greenspan used the Fed’s administrative authority to weaken Glass-Steagall by allowing banks to
derive a portion of their revenues from investment banking
activities.122
Following the savings and loan crisis, many questioned the
initial deregulatory moves made in the 1980s, and Congress
passed a major new law strengthening government oversight.
But Greenspan and others argued that more liberalization was
the solution. The problems in the banking system were not
symptoms of too little regulation but too much. Congress had
simply not gone far enough; the “key laws and regulations that
impose significant costs on many banks have been re118
Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. Supervision, Regulation &
Ins. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 1 (1987)
(testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys.) (transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/452/item/8367
[https://perma.cc/4Z54-SBWR]).
119
Id.
120
Id. at 3.
121
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the 24th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: An
Overview of Financial Restructuring 8 (May 12, 1988) (transcript available at
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/?item_id=8380&filepath=/files/docs/his
torical/greenspan/Greenspan_19880512.pdf) [https://perma.cc/CT7K-ALDE].
122
See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Legal Developments, 73 FED.
RES. BULL. 453, 473 (1987) (“Order Approving Applications to Engage in Limited
Underwriting and Dealing in Certain Securities”); Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Legal Developments, 73 FED. RES. BULL. 717, 731 (1987) (“Order
Approving Applications to Engage in Limited Underwriting and Dealing in Consumer-Receivable-Related Securities”).
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tained[,] . . . [including] the McFadden Act’s restrictions on
interstate branching, the Glass-Steagall Act’s constraints on
combinations of commercial and investment banking, [and] restrictions on the integration of banking and insurance[.]”123
Activity migration continued, but rather than seek to reverse it
as Volcker had, Greenspan argued that it revealed the need for
further deregulation.124 The Treasury Department even published a report in 1991, recommending that Congress eliminate
the separation of banking and commerce and allow non-bank
businesses to buy and own banks, arguing that this would
reduce the need for bailouts by providing a new source of capital to absorb loan losses.125
The Fed continued to weaken Glass-Steagall by raising the
limit on investment banking revenues in commercial banks to
25%; an aggressive interpretation of the 1933 statute.126 The
Fed also looked the other way as large conglomerates exploited
a loophole in the Bank Holding Company Act to acquire nonbanks that either refrained from commercial lending or from
issuing deposits.127
In 1993, the Clinton administration installed deregulatory
leaders at the Treasury Department and its bureau, the OCC.
The new Comptroller, Gene Ludwig, supported both “activities
diversification” (the repeal of Glass-Steagall) and “geographic
diversification” (the repeal of McFadden). Like Greenspan,
Ludwig thought that these changes would allow banks to better
“meet the needs of their local customers and communities as

123
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the 27th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition:
Banking in the 21st Century 2 (May 2, 1991) (transcript available at https://
fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/?item_id=8455&filepath=/files/docs/historical/
greenspan/Greenspan_19910502.pdf) [https://perma.cc/4WP8-95MT].
124
See Greenspan, supra note 118, at 7, 10 (noting that “[a]ttempts to hold the
present structure in place will be defeated through the inevitable loopholes that
innovation forced by competitive necessity will develop, although there will be
heavy costs in terms of competitive fairness and respect for law” and that “banking organizations are nearing the limits of their ability to act within existing law;
and spending real resources to interpret outmoded law creatively is hardly wise”).
125
See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS 57 (1991) (arguing that “allowing combinations of banking and commerce is particularly compelling in the context of
permitting commercial firms to acquire failed banks”).
126
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Notice, Revenue Limit on BankIneligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Docket No. R-0841 (Dec. 20, 1996).
127
See Shull, supra note 81, at 22.
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well as remain competitive in international financial
markets.”128
Embracing the vision of bankers like Hugh McColl, who
thought the best way for the banking industry to recover from
the thrift crisis was to “let the strong take over the weak,” the
Clinton administration prioritized the liberalization of interstate branching.129 In 1994, President Clinton pushed the
Riegle-Neal Act through Congress, repealing the McFadden restrictions, and kicking off a decade-long mergers bonanza.130
Within five years, the three largest banks in the country held
20% of all banking assets, twice their 1990 share. Several of
these growing banks sought to acquire insurance companies
and investment banks. Congress, with the support of the Treasury Department, the Fed, and the White House, finally repealed Glass-Steagall in 1999.131 Eight years later, the three
largest banks in the country held over 40% of all banking
assets.132
This structural transformation set the stage for a dramatic
shift in day-to-day supervision and regulation. Banks were no
longer specialized monetary institutions, they were sprawling
financial businesses. With banks’ unique public purposes obscured by their new activities, it no longer seemed clear why
the government should be involved in closely monitoring their
business through substantive supervision.
2.

Writing Formulas

Thus, a key plank of the reform agenda was minimizing
discretionary oversight. The new generation of policymakers
thought that substantive oversight, like bans, had deleterious
effects on salutary risk-taking, and they built a rules-based
128
Testimony Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. 1
(1995) (testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency) (transcript
available at https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/congressional-testi
mony/1995/pub-test-1995-133-written.pdf [https://perma.cc/CM3G-CFU8]).
129
Bill Medley, Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994, FED. RESERVE HISTORY (Sept. 1994), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/
essays/riegle_neal_act_of_1994 [https://perma.cc//RHF9-BQND].
130
Keith Bradsher, Interstate-Banking Bill Gets Final Approval in Congress,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/14/business/
interstate-banking-bill-gets-final-approval-in-congress.html [https://perma.cc/
HB93-EKJ2].
131
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
132
See Andrew Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Remarks at
the Institute of Regulation and Risk Conference: The $100 Billion Question 18
(Mar. 30, 2010) (transcript available at https://www.bis.org/review/r100406d
.pdf) [https://perma.cc/9B6P-YT4P] (depicting graphically the “[c]oncentration of
the US banking system in Chart 2”).
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regime in its place, converting the concept of safety-andsoundness into formulas. They believed that dramatically reducing discretionary oversight would increase bank profits, enhance system-wide resiliency and long-term stability, and
ensure U.S. supremacy in the global financial marketplace.
As with structural deregulation, the shift toward rules began in the early 1980s. But, unlike structural deregulation,
the promulgation of the first major rules was initially part of a
crackdown on bank risk-taking. In the beginning, the banking
agencies did not think much of rules as a method; they adopted
them more as a clear statement of supervisory policy.133
As mentioned earlier, the government traditionally assessed equity levels alongside loan portfolio quality, managerial
capability, funding mix, and economic conditions, as part of a
holistic safety and soundness review. Supervisors shunned
the sort of one-size-fits-all approach inherent in a rule. As one
senior OCC official noted in 1972, “such arbitrary formulas do
not always take into account important factors.”134 Or as the
FDIC Manual of Examination Policies stated, capital ratios are
“but a first approximation of a bank’s ability to withstand adversity. A low capital ratio by itself is no more conclusive of a
bank’s weakness than a high ratio is of its invulnerability.”135
Volcker noted on more than one occasion that capital ratios
were “crude.”136
But because equity capital stands between a bank and
disorderly default, inadequate levels of it are a critical concern.
In 1982, severe economic stagnation left banks with their lowest levels of equity funding ever (less than 4% of total assets at
the largest firms), and bank failures spiked to their highest
point since the 1930s. (Failures continued to rise every year of
Volcker’s term and did not drop below pre-1982 levels until
133
Between 1970 and 1981, the capital ratios for the then-largest banks in the
country (those with over $5 billion in assets) dropped 20%. Paul Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Bankers Association: Banking; A Framework for the Future
13 (Oct. 7, 1981) (transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/
?item_id=8245&filepath=/files/docs/historical/volcker/Volcker_19811007.pdf)
[https://perma.cc/RF6F-TVG5].
134
Susan Burhouse et al., Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving Forward, Looking Back, FDIC (Jan. 14, 2003), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/fyi/2003/011403fyi.html [https://perma.cc/YQM5-F8NZ].
135
Id.
136
Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Banking Association 8 (Oct.
21, 1985) (transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/?item_id=
8332&filepath=/files/docs/historical/volcker/Volcker_19851021.pdf) [https://
perma.cc/FU7F-RPKZ].
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1994.)137 Increasing bank leverage posed a challenge for supervisors. In 1981, to put all firms on notice, the Fed, drawing
on its § 1818 safety and soundness authority, issued guidance
regarding capital minimums in the form of a leverage ratio,
with equity capital in the numerator and total assets in the
denominator.
Even this seemingly simple ratio was a complex formula.
The numerator and denominator can both be manipulated
(capital may include preferred shares or equity-like debt instruments, and assets may include goodwill and other intangibles, or off-balance sheet exposures that can be hard to
value). The ratio was also blunt. But it was not meant to be a
primary regulatory tool—Volcker referred to it as an “arbitrary
‘rule of thumb.’ ”138 In conjunction with the guidance, the Fed
announced that supervisors would “monitor closely the capital
position of large banking organizations.”139
And they did. Over the next few years, both the Fed and
the OCC issued cease and desist orders under §1818 to address inadequate capital levels.140 Given the competition with
thrifts, some banks were not keen to comply. As Volcker himself acknowledged, there were “strong competitive pressures . . . pushing toward more leverage,”141 and as Greenspan
later put it, “[b]ank owners have incentives to minimize their
capital investments in order to maximize their returns[.]”142
For example, in 1983, Continental Illinois, one of the biggest
banks in the country, ran into trouble. Volcker pressured the
bank’s management to reduce risk, but the bank responded
with half measures.143 In 1984, the bank collapsed, and the

137
See Failures and Assistance Transactions—Historical Statistics on Banking, FDIC, https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30&Header=1
[https://perma.cc/C9AG-D6WM].
138
Volcker, supra note 136, at 9.
139
FED. RESERVE BOARD, ORDER APPROVING FORMATION OF BANK HOLDING COMPANY, ACQUISITION OF NONBANK AND EDGE ACT SUBSIDIARIES AND RETENTION OF NONBANK
COMPANIES; ORDER DENYING RETENTION OF TRAVEL AGENCY ACTIVITIES OF THOMAS COOK.
INC. 6 (1981).
140
Stephen K. Huber, Enforcement Powers of Federal Banking Agencies, 7
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 123, 147 (1988).
141
Volcker, supra note 136, at 8.
142
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks to the Annual Convention of the American Bankers Association 3 (Oct.
16, 1989) (transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/?item_id=
8417&filepath=/files/docs/historical/greenspan/Greenspan_19891016.pdf)
[https://perma.cc/Y9J2-PKXY].
143
Conversation with Paul Volcker, New Haven, Ct. (2012).
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government stepped in to rescue it. With assets of $40 billion,
it was, by far, the largest bank failure in American history.144
That same year, the First National Bank of Bellaire sued
the OCC claiming that the government did not have the authority to force it to reduce its leverage. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals handed down a shocking decision, finding that the
evidence presented by the OCC was insufficient to sustain its
capital order.145 In response, the banking agencies turned to
Congress. The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983
(ILSA), passed largely to address risky investments by U.S.
banks in Latin America, included provisions restricting precluding judicial review of capital orders and buttressing the
discretionary latitude of the banking agencies under § 1818.
The law also authorized the agencies to promulgate binding capital minimums through notice and comment
rulemaking.146
Ironically, in trying to save substantive oversight, Congress
may have hastened its demise.147 Concerned by the increasing
number of bank failures, in 1985, the banking agencies drew
on their authority under ILSA to establish a leverage ratio.148
This new rule was meant to play only a supporting role (at least
initially). Volcker explained that it was “simply [a] capital/asset ratio[ ] that cannot really reflect the diversity of risk among
banks[,]” further noting that it “seem[s] to provide some perverse incentives to reduce liquidity or relatively safe but lowmargin assets to curtail asset growth, while encouraging extraordinary growth in off-balance sheet risks, particularly at
very large banking organizations.”149 Volcker expected super144
See Failures and Assistance Transactions—Historical Statistics on Banking, supra note 137.
145
First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of Currency, 697 F.2d 674,
685–87 (5th Cir. 1983).
146
International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No.
98–181, §§ 902–913, 97 Stat. 1153, 1278 (1983) (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 3901–3912 (Supp. IV 1986)). Congress specifically overturned Bellaire
in part of the statute. See 12 U.S.C. § 3907(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985) (stating that
“[f]ailure . . . to maintain capital at or above its minimum level . . . may be deemed
by the appropriate Federal banking agency, in its discretion, to constitute an
unsafe and unsound practice within the meaning of section 1818”). See also
Michael P. Malloy, U.S. International Banking and the New Capital Adequacy
Requirements: New, Old and Unexpected, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 75, 76 (1988).
147
See Huber, supra note 140, at 147; Jack S. Older & Howard N. Cayne,
Capital Standards: Regulators Wield Big New Stick, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 30, 1984, at
11.
148
Minimum Capital Ratios, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,207 (Mar. 14, 1985) (codified at
12 C.F.R. pts. 3 & 7) (adopting a final regulation on capital requirements for
national banks).
149
Volcker, supra note 136, at 8.
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visors to still take the lead, and the Fed announced “a number
of [ ] steps to enhance the effectiveness of our supervisory activities . . . [including] intensifying the frequency and scope of our
examinations and inspections of larger banking
organizations[.]”150
When Greenspan succeeded Volcker in 1987, however, the
central bank changed course. Greenspan sought to use the
capital rules to limit supervisory discretion. To do this, the
rules would have to be refined. Greenspan and economists like
Anthony Santomero, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia, agreed with Volcker that leverage ratios could
be thwarted if banks shifted investments into higher risk assets.151 Since there were two ways for a bank to increase risk—
changing asset allocation by making riskier investments or
borrowing more money by reducing the amount of equity behind each investment—blocking off one avenue while leaving
the other open achieves very little. In fact, Santomero thought
it would make matters worse.152 If regulators treated all assets
alike, bankers would sell their safe assets and buy higher yielding, riskier ones. Instead of investing in treasuries, for example, bankers might make unsecured consumer loans. From the
perspective of a profit-maximizing shareholder, increasing leverage and increasing portfolio risk are economically equivalent.
In 1988, the Fed reached an international agreement with
nine other advanced economies through the Basel Committee
on Bank Supervision (Basel I).153 The countries agreed to common capital standards and risk-weights.154 The new regime
aimed to reduce overall enterprise risk by requiring more (or
less) capital depending on asset type.155 It grouped assets into
different categories (e.g., residential mortgages, business loans,
cash, and sovereign debt) and assigned them different risk
weights (e.g., 0%, 20%, 50%, and 100%).156 Regulators reduced the required percentage of equity funding (8% of total
150

Id. at 9.
See generally Michael Koehn & Anthony M. Santomero, Regulation of Bank
Capital and Portfolio Risk, 35 J. FIN. 1235 (1980); Daesik Kim & Anthony M.
Santomero, Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation, 43 J. FIN. 1219 (1988).
152
Koehn & Santomero, supra note 151, at 1235 (“[T]he results of a higher
required capital-asset ratio in terms of the average probability of failure are ambiguous, while the intra-industry dispersion of the probability of failure unambiguously increases”).
153
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988).
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See id. at 3–13.
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See id. at 1.
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assets) by weight, creating an incentive for banks to hold lower
risk assets (thus, banks were required to fund 4% of their
residential mortgages, subject to the 50% weighting, with
money from shareholders).157
For those like Greenspan who saw the growth of U.S. firms
into international megabanks as a key strategic priority for
U.S. economic policy, harmonization of regulatory standards
was of paramount importance. Yet Greenspan did not immediately expect supervision to fall away: “We will surely always
require supervision, monitoring, and regulation of some aspects of banking organizations,” he said in 1988, “[b]ut having
in place an effective risk-based capital system—and one that is
also widely used by the major industrial nations—would be a
major step in the right direction.”158 Or, as he put it in another
context, Basel I was “an important first step toward having in
place market oriented regulatory policies that encourage banking organizations to maintain adequate capital and prudently
manage their risk.”159
In the 1990s, the rules movement found new sources of
support in Congress who suspected that regulatory capture
and lax oversight had contributed to the savings and loan crisis. To these policymakers, rules offered a way to strengthen
regulatory safeguards. Throughout the 1990s, the Fed took
additional steps to expand these formulas in aid of both the
deregulatory agenda and an international push to expand into
foreign markets.160 Regulators tried to resolve the crudeness
problems by connecting the capital rules to complex internal
models produced by the banks themselves. For example, in
1996, the Market Risk Amendment allowed large financial conglomerates to use their own models to determine the required
amount of capital on their trading book. Many policymakers,
especially economists, saw these models as the future of the
capital rules—perfectly aligning capital charges with actual
risk, asset by asset.161
157

See id. at 14, 15.
Greenspan, supra note 121, at 10.
159
Id. at 9–10.
160
The rules were not calibrated by conducting a cost-benefit analysis and
determining the socially appropriate level of capital financing; they were set by
“norming,” essentially drawing a line two standard deviations below the mean
existing capital levels. See Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine
Capital-Adequacy Requirements?, 82 U. CHI. L. Rev. 1853, 1855 (2015).
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Meyer, supra note 16, at 97 (“[U]sing models to determine capital for market risk on traded securities and derivative positions is another genuine step
forward.”).
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By the mid-1990s, capital regulation anchored a new
shareholder-centric legal regime. The Fed thought that the
capital rules were a much less disruptive “intervention” than
traditional oversight, more narrowly tailored to “correcting” the
“market failures” precipitated by the safety net. “The key to
engendering market incentives,” Greenspan explained, “is to
require that those owners who would profit from an institution’s success have the appropriate amount of their own capital
at risk.”162 As he put it, “[the owners of depository institutions]
who stand to gain substantially if the institution is successful
must also stand to lose substantially if outcomes are not so
favorable.”163 Capital requirements were the cleanest and
most straightforward solution: “There is no better way to ensure that owners exert discipline on the behavior of their firm
than to require that they have a large stake in that enterprise.”164 In other words, if we “fortify the natural ‘shock absorbers’ of the financial system—capital and liquidity,” we can
“make better use of market and market-like incentives to discourage excessive risk-taking at individual [depository] institutions.”165 Ultimately, capital regulation would “offset the moral
hazard incentives” of the safety net.166
With this corrective in place, policymakers decided that
most other restrictions could be lifted.167 And, once the bans
were shorn away, the capital rules stood as the central pillars
around which a new supervisory regime was constructed.
3.

Proceduralizing Oversight

In the late 1990s, the Fed designed a new supervisory program for LCBOs to facilitate market discipline and minimize
government intervention in banking. Unlike traditional substantive oversight, which the Fed believed would be harmful
and inadequate for these conglomerates, risk-focused supervision used capital requirements and procedural oversight to
harness the salutary forces of the market.
162
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Remarks to the American Bankers Association: Innovation and Regulation of
Banks in the 1990s 5 (Oct. 11, 1988) (transcript available at https://fraser.st
louisfed.org/content/?item_id=8394&filepath=/files/docs/historical/green
span/Greenspan_19881011.pdf) [https://perma.cc/MY5F-4DTQ].
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Id.
164
Id.
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Id.
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Greenspan, supra note 99, at 2.
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Greenspan, supra note 123, at 11.
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The decline of discretionary oversight proceeded in three
phases. First, the risk-based capital formulas were finalized.
Second, the OCC created a program called “risk-based supervision,” leaving more oversight of outcomes to the market. Third,
Glass-Steagall was repealed and the Fed developed RFS, an
even more process-focused system of supervision for overseeing the largest conglomerates. Bank examinations did not end,
but what it took to fail one changed dramatically.
a.

Formulas Finalized

Greenspan first publicly expressed doubts about traditional supervision in 1992, soon after the risk-based capital
requirements went into effect. “[I]n our view,” he explained,
“sound banks,” meaning those well-capitalized under the Basel
rules, “need not be subject to intrusive supervision.”168 By
“intrusive supervision,” he meant the sort of substantive oversight that had existed up until that point—extensive transaction testing and a full review of a bank’s investments and
activities. Even before the industry had evolved into its modern
form, Greenspan decided that the Basel rules reduced the need
for supervisors to reach their own conclusions about leverage
and asset risk.169
b.

Risk-Based Supervision

Following the repeal of the McFadden Act restrictions, the
OCC announced a new program for overseeing large banks
called risk-based supervision (RBS). Risk-based supervision
was embraced, in part, because the savings and loan crisis had
discredited the traditional approach to bank oversight. Eugene
Ludwig, the new head of the OCC, sold the program to Congress as a step forward, an effort to stay ahead of the curve. In
his words, RBS “identifies those activities and products that
pose the greatest risk to an institution and evaluates the effec168

Greenspan, supra note 99, at 2.
It was several more years before Greenspan split fully from the traditional
framework. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Remarks before the 30th Annual Conference of Bank Structure and
Competition: Optimal Bank Supervision in a Changing World 10–11, (May 12,
1994) (transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/452/item/8507)
[https://perma.cc/HVX6-QAP2] (noting that “the core of bank supervision must
continue to be the on-site evaluation of the individual bank” and that the “basic
‘unit of supervision’” had to be the “evaluation and stress-testing of the bank’s
overall risk position”).
169
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tiveness of the institution’s policies and processes to control
the risks associated with those products and activities.”170
Supervisors, of course, had long considered these aspects
of bank activities, especially governance, as part of safety and
soundness (the “M” in CAMELS is for management). For example, examiners traditionally considered underwriting policies
because intervening to address an inappropriate underwriting
policy is better than waiting to act until a bank’s assets are
underperforming. These processes are related to and precede
outcomes. The OCC—and others171—emphasized how increasing procedural oversight would be more preventative,
“strategic[ ],” and “forward-looking.”172 For example, in 1995,
Ludwig argued that the root causes of two recent bank failures,
Daiwa and Barings, emanated from a “failure to separate the
risk management and control functions from the risk-taking
function and an inadequate level of oversight by senior management.”173 He suggested that, for large banks, this is why
the OCC would be placing “great emphasis on the need
for . . . strong internal controls.”174
But at the same time, Ludwig pulled back on-site, handson bank examinations from large firms and “directed a concerted effort to streamline [ ] supervision and lower its cost.”175
“I strongly believe,” he told Congress, “the key for bank supervisors . . . is to identify the risks incurred by banks, to assess
their systems for managing those risks, and to ensure that the
170
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H.
Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. 3 (1995) (testimony of Eugene A.
Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency) (transcript available at https://www.occ
.treas.gov/news-issuances/congressional-testimony/1995/pub-test-1995-133written.pdf) [https://perma.cc/CM3G-CFU8].
171
GAO assessed the new approach and found that “risk-focused examinations are intended to be more forward looking, focusing on banks’ management
practices and controls to manage current and future risks. Prior to the adoption
of a risk-focused approach, examinations were more retrospective. Examiners
assessed a bank’s overall safety and soundness by testing transactions that were
based on past decisions and past management practices.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-48, RISK-FOCUSED BANK EXAMINATIONS: REGULATORS OF
LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS FACE CHALLENGES 5 (2000).
172
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H.
Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Eugene A.
Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency) (transcript available at https://www.occ
.treas.gov/news-issuances/congressional-testimony/1997/pub-test-1997-90written.pdf) [https://perma.cc/K9SP-DCCF].
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Ludwig, supra note 170, at 6.
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Id. at 7.
175
Testimony Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. 2
(1996) (testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency) (transcript
available at https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/congressional-testimony/1996/pub-test-1996-32-written.pdf) [https://perma.cc/G86U-DTH8].
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banks’ risk management systems are, in fact, identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling risks.”176 As the OCC’s
analysis increasingly began and ended with the process and
never turned to the results (e.g., whether underwriting standards were too low or whether capital was strained), supervision became a very different exercise. Ludwig welcomed this:
“[a]s the banking industry adapts to a dynamic economy,” he
explained, “so too must bank supervision evolve.”177
c.

Risk-Focused Supervision

Following the roll-out of Ludwig’s more process-centric approach to bank supervision, the Fed developed RFS—an even
more process-centric approach designed especially with LCBOs
in mind.
Greenspan first articulated this framework at a conference
in Sweden. “Within the United States,” he explained, “the Federal Reserve and other bank supervisors are placing growing
importance on a bank’s risk management process and . . . are
also working to develop supervisory tools and techniques that
utilize available technology and that help supervisors perform
their duties with less disruption to banks.”178 For example,
rather than evaluate a high percentage of a bank’s loans and
investment products by reviewing individual transactions, we
will increasingly seek to ensure that the management process
itself is sound, and that adequate policies and controls exist.
While still important, the amount of transaction testing, especially at large banks, will decline.179

Whereas supervisors’ primary priority had traditionally
been forming an independent view of safety and soundness,
Greenspan saw “[e]ncouraging and promoting sound qualitative risk management and internal controls” as “a high priority
of bank supervisors.”180 In fact, for the largest firms, he now
viewed substantive oversight as potentially damaging:
We supervisors will be appreciably more involved in evaluating individual bank risk management processes, than afterthe-fact results. In doing so, however, we must be assured
that with rare and circumscribed exceptions we do not substitute supervisory judgments for management decisions.
That is the road to moral hazard and inefficient bank man176
177
178
179
180
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agement. Fortunately, the same technology and innovation
that is driving supervisors to focus on management
processes will, through the development of sophisticated
market structures and responses, do much of our job of ensuring safety and soundness. We should be careful not to
impede the process.181

Greenspan, in a series of public remarks, gave a range of reasons for minimizing substantive oversight, including (1) banks’
expansion into new activities, which had “begun to render obsolete much of the bank examination regime established in
earlier decades”;182 (2) technological change, which allowed supervisors to piggy-back on bank’s quantitatively rigorous assessments of risk;183 (3) the tendency of bank shareholders to
look out for their own interests; (4) the need to promote market
discipline and ensure that shareholders manage risks appropriately;184 and (5) “scarce examination resources,” “most effectively employed by focusing on risk management
processes.”185 The Fed also argued that supervisors would no
longer be able to keep up with the bankers they regulated.
Substantive oversight, Greenspan explained:
181

Id. at 15–16.
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks Before the Annual Meeting and Conference of the Conference of State
Bank Supervisors: Our Banking History (May 2, 1998) (transcript available at
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/?item_id=8636&filepath=/files/docs/historical/greenspan/Greenspan_19980502.pdf) [https://perma.cc/JW92-ZTSY]
[hereinafter Greenspan, Our Banking History]. As Greenspan explained elsewhere: “In recent years, the focus of supervisory efforts in the United States has
been on the internal risk measurement and management processes of banks.
This emphasis on internal processes has been driven partly by the need to make
supervisory policies more risk-focused in light of the increasing complexity of
banking activities.” Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Remarks Before the Conference on Capital Regulation in the 21st
Century: The Role of Capital in Optimal Banking Supervision and Regulation
(Feb. 26, 1998) (transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/
?item_id=8629&filepath=/files/docs/historical/greenspan/Greenspan_19980226.pdf) [https://perma.cc/8TNA-M2PE].
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See Greenspan, supra note 169, at 1 (“[T]he technological characteristics of
banking products and services are changing profoundly. As a result, the ways in
which we conduct bank supervision must also change.”).
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Greenspan explained: “To cite the most obvious and painful example, without federal deposit insurance, private markets presumably would never have
permitted thrift institutions to purchase the portfolios that brought down the
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Banking History, supra note 182, at 7.
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Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Annual Meeting and Conference of the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors: Financial Reform and the Importance of the State Charter (May 3,
1997) (transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/?item_id=85
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requires that regulators be able to attract and retain a highly
trained and capable staff . . . [but] I am concerned about our
ability to continue to do this, given what appears to be a
widening gap between the returns that the brightest financial
minds can make in the private marketplace compared to
what they can make in government.186

To convert these ideas into a minimally invasive, marketfriendly regime for overseeing large banks, the Fed launched a
task force, called the F-6, composed of three Reserve Bank
presidents, three Board Governors, and chaired by Governor
Meyer.187 The F-6 developed RFS for independently testing and
comparing internal control systems and risk management
practices at LCBOs.188 As Greenspan explained the purpose of
the new approach:
[I]n contemplating the growing complexity of our largest
banking organizations, it seems to us that the supervisors
have little choice but to try to rely more—not less—on market
discipline—augmented by more effective public disclosures—
to carry an increasing share of the oversight load. This is, of
course, only feasible for those, primarily large, banking organizations that rely on uninsured liabilities in a significant
way.189

In addition to avoiding the damaging effects of government intervention, the Fed thought this new policy was needed because LCBOs were too complex to supervise traditionally; as
Meyer put it, “market discipline” “must play a greater role.”190
Herein lies the need for procedural discretionary oversight.
“[M]arkets,” Meyer explained, “cannot operate well without
transparency.”191 A “prerequisite for market discipline is [the]
more rapid dissemination of information by the regulators and,
186

Greenspan, supra note 169, at 12.
Meyer, supra note 16, at 98 (discussing the work of Mark Flannery and
Charlie Calomiris on market discipline).
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See SUPERVISORY LETTER, SR 99-15, supra note 8. The policy built on a 1995
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THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. RESERVE, SR 00-13, FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL HOLDING
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more importantly, the direct provision to market participants of
critical and timely information about risk exposures by the
LCBOs themselves.”192 This is of particular concern in banking, a notoriously opaque business, in which insiders can shift
investments quickly and easily without public notice.193 Thus,
supervisors’ new task would be to ensure that managers disseminated relevant information to shareholders quickly by “reviewing an LCBO’s disclosures to confirm that the
organization’s policy is consistent with best practices and to
confirm that the bank’s actual disclosures are consistent with
its own policy.”194
The risk-focused approach emphasized procedural elements even further removed from actual risk-taking. For example, rather than examine the underwriting policy itself,
supervisors focused on the process of drafting and approving
the underwriting policy. Supervisors would no longer decide
for themselves whether the policy reflected an excessive risk
appetite. Instead, they would consider whether the board was
involved in reviewing the policy and whether control functions
were involved in applying it. They might look at whether the
firm produced projections of potential losses using state-ofthe-art modeling technology or whether those forecasts were
shared with the board in a timely manner. This sort of oversight was designed to ensure that the market could police risktaking. RFS was necessary because “[p]ublic disclosure is not
going to be easy for bankers because it may well bring new
pressures that they may not like in the short run.”195
RFS, then, was a logical extension of the emphasis on capital regulation, which sought to put shareholders in the driver’s
seat by addressing the “need[ ] for larger shock absorbers and
for increased private incentives to monitor and control risk.”196
This need to replace traditional supervisory oversight with mar192

Id.
See SUPERVISORY LETTER, SR 99-15, supra note 8 (“Given the speed with
which risk profiles can change the Federal Reserve’s approach to
LCBOs . . . plac[es] increased emphasis on an organization’s internal systems and
controls for managing risk.”); see also Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of
Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 14–15 (1976) (arguing that “a financial
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ket oversight was “the fundamental reason[ ] why increasing
the amount of capital in the depository institution system has
been a major goal of . . . regulatory policy.”197 As the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission explained it, the OCC and the Fed
“acted something like consultants, working with banks to assess the adequacy of their systems.”198
d.

Propagation

Other agencies adopted the Fed’s approach to overseeing
LCBOs, including the OCC. In its Large Bank Supervision:
Comptroller’s Handbook, the OCC explained that their examiners would no longer “attempt to restrict risk-taking but rather
[to] determine whether banks identify and effectively manage
the risks they assume.”199 Treasury Secretary Rubin praised
these “actions . . . to focus supervisors much more strongly on
banks’ assessment of market risk and their systems for evaluating that risk.”200
The acclaim was not universal. In 2000, the General Accounting Office (GAO) produced an assessment of risk-focused
examinations and noted several shortcomings:
Regulators face a number of challenges in supervising and
examining large, complex banks. Since a risk-focused approach requires that examiners make judgments that may
result in some bank operations receiving minimal scrutiny,
the possibility exists that some risks may not be appropriately identified. . . . [R]egulators [also] face challenges in
ensuring that their assessments of risk are sufficiently independent of the bank’s risk-management systems and are
mindful of industrywide risk trends.201

Nonetheless, the formula-driven, risk-focused approach
appeared to be working. The banking industry grew much
larger and more profitable, and, as a result, became better
capitalized. The U.S. exported its model overseas through the
Basel Committee. The Basel II accord, which the US never
technically adopted, provided a three-pillared framework for
banking oversight: “market discipline,” meaning private moni197

Id.
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 20, at 307.
199
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 16, at 3.
200
Robert E. Rubin, Treasury Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks on
Reform of the International Financial Architecture to the School of Advanced
International Studies (Apr. 21, 1999) (transcript available at https://www.trea
sury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr3093.aspx [https://perma.cc/
9GPM-DV9V]).
201
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 171, at 7.
198
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toring by shareholders and creditors, “supervision,” meaning
compliance verification and procedural oversight to facilitate
market discipline, and “capital regulation,” meaning risk-based
capital requirements to ensure that shareholders have enough
skin in the game to adequately oversee bank executives.202
RFS, in other words, was the irreducible rump of safety
and soundness—the aspects of discretionary judgment that
the banking agencies decided to preserve as the proper purview
of government officials after converting traditional supervisory
wisdom about bank risk and leverage into rules (and outsourcing the rest). Capital requirements, in the new regime, are not
merely, or even primarily, efforts to increase firms’ loss absorbing capacity.203 Rather, they are central columns in a legal
architecture designed to facilitate private sector oversight.204
On his way out in 2006, Greenspan summarized the transformation: “[s]upervision has become increasingly less invasive
and increasingly more systems- and policy-oriented. These
changes have been induced by evolving technology, increased
complexity, and lessons learned from significant banking crises, not to mention constructive criticism from the banking
community.”205
Ben Bernanke, who succeed Greenspan as Chairman in
2006, adopted his predecessor’s approach. He advocated for
further regulatory relief, because, as he noted, “[m]inimizing
the regulatory burden on banks is very important.”206 “The
202

See generally, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEInternational Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards:
A Revised Framework (2004) (setting forth the “Basel II” framework and explaining
the three pillars).
203
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 160, at 1854 (“Bank regulators care about
capital adequacy because their mandate is to prevent bank panics and contagions. A bank with a high ratio of capital to assets will, all else equal, be better
able to withstand a sudden loss . . . .”).
204
This legal ordering was intentionally deregulatory: “Increased government
regulation,” as Greenspan put it, “is inconsistent with a banking system that can
respond to the kinds of changes that have characterized recent years, changes
that are expected to accelerate in the years ahead.” Evolution of Bank Supervision, supra note 103.
205
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks Before the Independent Community Bankers of America National Convention: Bank Regulation (Mar. 11, 2005) (transcript available at https://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050311/default.htm)
[https://perma.cc/TZ6K-B7H2].
206
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks Before the Annual Convention of the American Bankers Association and
the Annual Convention of America’s Community Bankers: Bank Regulation and
Supervision; Balancing Benefits and Costs (Oct. 16, 2006) (transcript available at
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/?item_id=8944&filepath=/files/docs/his
torical/bernanke/bernanke_20061016.pdf) [https://perma.cc/B4V2-QK84].
MENTS,
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objective” of the banking agencies, he said, was “to address
weaknesses in management and internal controls before financial performance suffers rather than being satisfied with identifying what went wrong after the fact.”207 “At the heart of the
modern bank examination,” he explained, “is an assessment of
the quality of a bank’s procedures for evaluating, monitoring,
and managing risk, and of the bank’s internal models for determining economic capital.”208 Even “supervisory policies regarding prompt corrective action,” he pointed out, “are linked
to a bank’s leverage and risk-based capital ratios.”209 Indeed,
the banking agencies had explicitly tied safety and soundness
to the capital formulas, converting a discretionary exercise to a
rules-based one. As Bernanke put it: “Capital regulation is the
cornerstone of . . . [our] efforts to maintain a safe and sound
banking system.”210 Had he made the equivalent statement
about monetary policy—the Taylor Rule is the cornerstone of
our efforts to maintain price stability and maximum sustainable employment—people surely would have taken greater
notice.211
Instead, these policy changes have been largely overlooked.212 And supervision has become far less important.213
What was once a banking system predicated on the close substantive oversight of institutions performing critical monetary
functions became a system composed of massive conglomerates offering a wide range of financial products and services.
207
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Stonier Graduate School of Banking: Modern Risk Management
and Banking Supervision (June 12, 2006) (transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/?item_id=8935&filepath=/files/docs/historical/
bernanke/bernanke_20060612.pdf) [https://perma.cc/6DEK-JCX8] (emphasis
in original).
208
Id.
209
Bernanke, supra note 206.
210
Id.
211
See generally John B. Taylor, Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, 39
CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON PUB. POL’Y 195 (1993) (advocating monetary
policy by rule).
212
But see generally FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (A. Joanne
Kellermann, Jakob de Haan & Femke de Vries eds., 2013) (assessing European
supervisors’ practices and methods); Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, The
Evolution of Financial Supervision: The Continuing Search for the Holy Grail, in 50
YEARS OF MONEY AND FINANCE: LESSONS AND CHALLENGES 263 (Morten Balling &
Ernest Gnan eds., 2013) (comparing supervisory approaches in advanced economies); Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1897
(discussing supervision as one of the available banking law tools).
213
During the five years preceding the crisis, for example, the ten biggest
recipients of bailout dollars were not subject to a single safety and soundness
enforcement action. Nor were firms with over $50 billion in assets subject to
enforcement actions between September 2005 and September 2008.
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These new banks, too sprawling to be supervised through
traditional methods, were governed instead by formulas designed to facilitate market discipline. Policymakers thought
that LCBOs would function most effectively if they were protected from state interference. Unfortunately, they were wrong.
III
DISCRETIONARY OVERSIGHT POST-CRISIS
Following the 2008 crisis, many policy makers repudiated
the market-based philosophy that characterized the pre-crisis
regulatory regime. Congress and the agencies made significant
changes to the broader financial system by reforming the derivatives markets and enhancing consumer protections. But in
banking law, post-crisis supervisory policy continues to reflect
pre-crisis ideas. Specifically, the dramatic methodological and
conceptual changes made during the Deregulatory Era (i.e., the
shift from bans to formulas and substantive to procedural
oversight) have been left largely undisturbed.
This Part examines post-crisis supervisory policy and considers some of the forces preventing supervisors from preventing returning to Quiet Period methods of substantive oversight.
It also examines the development of annual Fed stress testing
(which I consider a form of substantive oversight) and some of
the potential consequences of watering down these stress tests
and reverting to an entirely rules-based regime.
A.

Supervisory Policy Post Crisis

Although “market discipline” was largely rejected following
the 2008 financial crisis, pre-crisis methods—namely, formulas and procedural oversight—remain, with one exception, the
legal tools banking agencies use to oversee financial
conglomerates.
1.

The Repudiation of Market Oversight

In 2011, reflecting on the 2008 financial collapse, Janet
Yellen, who succeeded Bernanke as Fed Chair, noted that “our
system of regulation and supervision was fatally flawed.”214
“The notion,” she explained, “that financial markets should be
as free as possible from regulatory fetters . . . evolved into a
conviction that those markets could, to a very considerable
214
Janet L. Yellen, Macroprudential Supervision and Monetary Policy in the
Post-Crisis World, 46 BUS. ECON. 3, 4 (2011).
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extent, police themselves.”215 Bill Dudley, the President of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the division of the Fed with
day-to-day supervisory responsibility for twelve of the sixteen
largest financial institutions in the U.S., resurfaced the traditional wisdom that “[f]inancial firms exist, in part, to benefit the
public, not simply their shareholders, employees and corporate
clients.”216
This thinking is reflected in the development of a new philosophy, known as macroprudential regulation, which has
emerged following the crisis. Macroprudential regulation eschews the notion that what is good for shareholders is good for
the public at large. Instead, it holds that “actions that may
seem desirable or reasonable from the perspective of individual
institutions may result in unwelcome system outcomes.”217
On this view, RFS, which seeks to promote market discipline, may hasten rather than hinder the onslaught of panic
and distress. That is because “multiple individually rational
decisions can aggregate into a collectively self-defeating—even
calamitous—outcome.”218 For example, a bank may seek to
tighten its lending standards during a downturn to strengthen
its balance sheet. But if all banks tighten their lending standards during a downturn, they will exacerbate the economic
contraction, leading to a further deterioration in the value of
each bank’s loan portfolio. (The exact opposite can happen
during a boom, potentially fueling a credit-induced asset
bubble.)
Macroprudential policy has its roots in monetary policy,
which seeks to address similar problems affecting inflation and

215

Id.
William C. Dudley, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y., Remarks at the Workshop on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the
Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20, 2014) (transcript available at https://
www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dud141020a.html [https://
perma.cc/9X2P-6CES]).
217
Andrew Crockett, Gen. Manager of the Bank for Int’l Settlements & Chairman of the Fin. Stability Forum, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Remarks Before the
Eleventh International Conference of Banking Supervisors: Marrying the Microand Macro-Prudential Dimensions of Financial Stability (Sept. 20, 2000) (transcript available at https://www.bis.org/review/r000922b.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3AG7-VA3Q]) (distinguishing in a systematic way for the first time the difference
between the two approaches).
218
Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and
Soundness’ to Systematic ‘Financial Stability’ in Financial Supervision, 9 VA L. &
BUS. REV. 201, 207 (2015).
216
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the money supply.219 Specifically, when people’s choices to
spend or save all skew in the same direction, they can lead to
vicious cycles of rising prices or crippling deflation. To correct
these problems, the Fed routinely adjusts interest rates to
lower asset values and tamp down on inflation, or vice-versa.
Similarly, effective macroprudential policy requires the government to reduce risk-taking activity by banks in boom times and
encourage it in downturns. The soundness of individual institutions, of course, is still important,220 but market discipline
on its own can be quite harmful. Importantly, macroprudential
policy requires government officials to make complex discretionary judgments in response to rapidly changing events.
2.

The Persistence of Procedural Oversight

This philosophical reorientation has only partially infiltrated the level of fundamental methods. Supervisory and regulatory policy, with one critical exception discussed below, still
rely on elaborate balance sheet formulas combined with procedural oversight.
a.

Formulas

Following the 2008 collapse, regulators recognized that the
capital rules as written were insufficient to align bank activities
with the public interest. Key aspects of safety and soundness
judgments had been missing and had not been enforced
through substantive oversight. To that end, the agencies
promulgated a flurry of new formulas to govern other aspects of
bank balance sheets such as the liquidity coverage ratio, a
formula requiring banks to hold a certain percentage of liquid
assets to cover potential funding shortfalls;221 the net stable
219
See Donald Kohn, Robert S. Kerr Senior Fellow in Econ. Studies & External
Member of the Fin. Policy Comm. of the Bank of Eng., Brookings Inst., Remarks to
the Federal Reserve Board’s Boston Conference: Implementing Macroprudential
and Monetary Policies; The Case for Two Committees (Oct. 2, 2015) (transcript
available at https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/implementing-macropru
dential-and-monetary-policies-the-case-for-two-committees) [https://perma.cc/
87TE-6997] (discussing the need to create a macroprudential policy committee to
parallel to the Fed’s monetary policy committee); William. McChesney Martin, Jr.,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address Before the New
York Group of the Investment Bankers Association of America (Oct. 19, 1955)
(transcript available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/?item_id=7800&file
path=/files/docs/historical/martin/martin55_1019.pdf) [https://perma.cc/
T4HY-6D9B] (outlining how monetary policy makers exercise discretion in their
roles).
220
See Hockett, supra note 218, at 212.
221
Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Management Standards, 79 Fed.
Reg. 61,440 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 249).
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funding ratio, a formula requiring banks to maintain a certain
minimum percentage of long-term liabilities to reduce the likelihood of runs;222 and the G-SIB surcharge, a formula requiring
larger, more complex firms to fund themselves with additional
capital to compensate for the risks their distress poses to financial stability.223 These new rules all reflect aspects of safety
and soundness that are not aligned with shareholder interests.
Regulators also strengthened and expanded the risk-based
capital requirements and implemented an enhanced supplementary leverage ratio. These steps are consistent with the
pre-crisis strategy of incentivizing market participants to oversee firms. They also increased loss absorbing capacity, reducing the likelihood of systemic crises.
b.

Procedural Oversight

Rules remain the primary methods by which the agencies
regulate outcomes. And RFS remains the official policy of the
Fed and the OCC.224 Oddly, official Fed reviews of supervisory
practice following the crisis did not consider the inconsistencies between the procedural approach, based on market discipline, and the post-crisis consensus that market discipline
does not effectively advance monetary stability. As mentioned
earlier, the OCC’s Large Bank Supervision: Comptroller’s Handbook, revised as recently as May 2017, still includes the statement that OCC supervisors “do not attempt to restrict risktaking but rather determine whether banks identify and effectively manage the risks they assume.”225
And, senior agency leaders continue to emphasize their
procedural remit. In 2014, Governor Tarullo, one of the primary architects of the post-crisis regulatory regime, described
day-to-day supervision of large firms as focused on risk man222
Net Stable Funding Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards and Disclosure Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 35, 124 (proposed June 1, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 249).
223
Regulatory Capital Rules: Implementation of Risk-Based Capital
Surcharges for Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Companies, 80 Fed.
Reg. 49, 082 (Aug. 14, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208 & 217).
224
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 63 (9th ed. 2005) (“The goal of the risk-focused supervision
process is to identify the greatest risks to a banking organization and assess the
ability of the organization’s management to identify, measure, monitor, and control these risks.”); see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note
16 at 2–3.
225
Id. at 3.
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agement.226 Another senior supervisory official described the
practice almost exactly as Governor Meyer had over a decade
ago: “[s]upervision focuses on monitoring, oversight and enforcing compliance with law, and [setting] supervisory expectations for firms’ governance, internal processes and controls,
and financial condition.”227 The official further noted: “[o]ne of
our fundamental responsibilities is to ensure that each institution has in place the appropriate risk identification and risk
management processes that are necessary for prudent banking.”228 Or as a recent Fed compendium argued:
Examiners look at key aspects of a supervised firm’s businesses and risk management functions to assess the adequacy of the firm’s systems and processes for identifying,
measuring, monitoring, and controlling the risks the firm is
taking. . . . In addition [supervision] evaluates the adequacy
of a firm’s capital and liquidity.229

In other words, supervisors check to see if a bank’s risk management professionals reviewed investments and shared important information with their boards. Although an important
part of risk-focused supervision is continuous monitoring, the
stated purpose of the monitoring is not to correct excessive
risks as soon as possible: it is to “develop and maintain an
understanding of the organization, its risk profile, and associated policies and practices.”230 These are the same process
checks that Greenspan and Meyer developed to facilitate market discipline.
Even in addressing the most egregious case of post-crisis
“moral hazard,” an episode popularly known as the London
Whale, the banking agencies explained the problem in proce226
Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Association of American Law Schools Midyear Meeting: Corporate
Governance and Prudential Regulation 15 (June 9, 2014) (transcript available at
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/content/?item_id=476716&filepath=/files/docs/
historical/federal%20reserve%20history/bog_members_statements/tarullo2014
0609a.pdf) [https://perma.cc/MVP8-CJVN] (“Neither we nor shareholders should
be comfortable with a process in which strategic decisions are made in one silo,
risk-appetite setting in another, and capital planning in yet a third. . . .”).
227
Kevin Stiroh, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at
the SIFMA Internal Auditors Society Education Luncheon: The Theory and Practice of Supervision (Apr. 11, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.newyork
fed.org/newsevents/speeches/2016/sti160411) [https://perma.cc/ENA2-434T].
228
Id.
229
See Eisenbach, supra note 21, at 60.
230
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. RESERVE, SR 08-9 / CA
08-12, SUPERVISORY LETTER ON CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE COMBINED U.S. OPERATIONS OF FOREIGN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (Oct. 16,
2008).
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dural terms. Although JP Morgan Chase had lost $6 billion231
on a twelve-figure bet on exotic derivatives in its commercial
banking subsidiary,232 the Fed and OCC faulted JP Morgan
merely for failing to adequately supervise their traders,233
properly value their investments,234 “implement adequate controls,”235 and “ensure significant information . . . was provided
in a timely and appropriate manner to the examiners.”236 Officials made no mention of the excessive risk-taking or other
substantive failings by the bank’s employees and executives.
The persistence of RFS is consistent with the Fed’s stated
preference for using rules to govern permissible outcomes. As
one Fed paper puts it:
The Federal Reserve’s prudential supervisory activities are
closely related to its role as a regulator of these firms. . . . The
two activities are linked because an important part of prudential supervision is verifying compliance with regulation,
although as much of the preceding discussion [describing
risk-focused supervision] suggests, the scope of supervision
is much broader than compliance alone. . . . In particular,
information about industry practice and institutional activities that is gained through prudential supervision can be
used in developing regulations governing those activities.
Regulation based on in-depth knowledge of industry practice
can better achieve desired policy outcomes while reducing
unintended consequences. . . . In other words, regulation
guides supervisory activities, and supervision in turn pro231
To put the loss in perspective, JP Morgan typically makes a profit of around
$5 billion per quarter across its entire business. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR HOLDING COMPANIES—FR Y-9C: JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 3 (Jun. 24, 2016) (reporting nearly $22
billion in annual net income). The Whale losses stand out for occurring in a
benign credit market when interest rates were stable and interbank lending conditions were normal.
232
See Stephanie Ruhle et al., JPMorgan Trader’s Positions Said to Distort
Credit Indexes, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 6, 2012, 10:43 AM), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2012-04-05/jpmorgan-trader-iksil-s-heft-is-said-todistort-credit-indexes [https://perma.cc/84YP-ZWRF].
233
Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued Upon Consent Pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as Amended 4, JPMorgan Chase & Co.,
No. 13-031-CMP-HC (Sept. 18, 2013) (“JPMC exercised inadequate oversight . . . .”) [hereinafter Federal Reserve Board Order]; Consent Order for a Civil
Money Penalty 3, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. AA-EC-2013-75 (Sept. 18
2013) (“The Bank’s oversight and governance . . . were inadequate . . . .”) [hereinafter OCC Order].
234
OCC Order, supra note 233, at 3 (“The Bank’s valuation control processes
and procedures . . . were insufficient to provide a rigorous and effective assessment of valuation”).
235
Federal Reserve Board Order, supra note 233, at 4 (“JPMC . . . failed to
implement adequate controls . . . . ”).
236
Id. at 4.
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vides information that allows the Federal Reserve to develop
and maintain regulations that more effectively address its
public policy objectives.237

On this view, rule-writing is used to influence outcomes and
supervision to check whether the rules are being followed and
achieving their goals.
3.

Stress Testing as Substantive Oversight

At the same time, the Fed has implicitly acknowledged that
the formula-based system of procedural oversight is, on its
own, insufficient. As Tarullo put it, though “fostering sound
risk–management practices serves the overlapping interests of
both shareholders and regulators,” the “divergence of interests
comes not in the architecture of risk management but in substantive decisions on risk appetite.”238 Therefore, he argues
that “prudential regulation [must] influence the processes of
risk-taking within regulated financial firms as a complementary tool to capital requirements and other substantive measures.”239 The Fed has taken some steps to revive targeted
substantive oversight along these lines.
a.

CCAR

The most significant change in the post-crisis approach to
overseeing the banking system has been the Fed’s use of stress
testing, particularly through a program it calls the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). Stress testing is a
forward-looking, risk-mitigation exercise that uses a hypothetical macroeconomic path for the next six to eight quarters, historical data, and regression analysis to forecast capital and
liquidity outcomes for individual institutions under adverse
conditions.240 Supervisors independently project values for
each line of a bank’s business, calculate the bank’s hypothetical future interest income and fee income, its noninterest expense and charge-off rates. In cases where historical data is
potentially unreliable or features limited variation, supervisors
may manually impose shocks to mimic past crises in other
asset classes. All these variables are then added together to
paint a holistic picture of a bank’s financial health.241
237

Eisenbach et al., supra note 21, at 60.
Tarullo, supra note 227, at 10.
239
Id. at 9–10.
240
See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 134 (2011).
241
See BEVERLY HIRTLE ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO.
663, ASSESSING FINANCIAL STABILITY: THE CAPITAL AND LOSS ASSESSMENT UNDER STRESS
SCENARIOS (CLASS) MODEL (rev. 2015).
238
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The Fed pioneered stress testing during the crisis,242 and
the Dodd-Frank Act required the Fed to continue these stress
tests for large institutions going forward.243 Drawing on safety
and soundness authority and the ISLA, the Fed then developed
CCAR, a more stringent regime used to determine whether to
allow large banks to pay dividends to shareholders or conduct
share repurchases.244 Over the last several years, many banks
have been forced to reduce their payouts and alter their business strategies to comply with these new supervisory
requirements.245
Consistent with the turn toward macroprudential policy
described above, CCAR allows policy makers to increase the
severity of stressed scenarios and limit the ability of banks to
raise their leverage in periods of expansion. CCAR also serves
microprudential goals, and in those respects, it closely resembles Quiet Period oversight. For example, it helps to address
regulatory arbitrage and controls for uncertainty by allowing
supervisors to incorporate new scenarios not originally envisioned when the rules were written.
b.

CCAR as a Rule

CCAR is designed to be a discretionary exercise, with the
power to, as former Chairman William McChesney Martin put
it, take away the punch bowl “just when the party [is] really
warming up.”246 Unsurprisingly, banks have resisted CCAR,
and some members of Congress are pushing the Fed to eliminate it entirely.247 Those who are proposing less radical steps
are targeting the very aspects of the exercise that are discretionary. They argue that the Fed should be forced to publish its
242
See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 240, at 134–35 (characterizing stress testing as a forward-looking risk mitigation tool).
243
See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a)(1) (2012).
244
See 12 C.F.R. § 225.8 (2015) (although the Fed does not specify the statutory authority for this specific provision of Regulation Y, known as the “capital
planning” rule, any plausible reading of the statutes that the Fed does specify as
providing their authority for promulgating Part 225 overall, such as 12
C.F.R. § 225.1 (2015) (“Authority, purpose, and scope”), indicates that § 225.8 is
promulgated pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818 and 12 U.S.C. § 3907, the latter section having been enacted by the ILSA to buttress capital actions under § 1818.
245
Barney Jopson & Alistair Gray, Deutsche Bank and Santander Fail Fed
Stress Tests Again, FIN. TIMES (June 29, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/
9a018afe-3e37-11e6-9f2c-36b487ebd80a [https://perma.cc/HC2T-HFDG].
246
Martin, Jr. supra note 219, at 12.
247
See Elizabeth Dexheimer & Jesse Hamilton, Yellen Urged to Abolish Stress
Tests as GOP Pursues Banks’ Wish List, BLOOMBERG NEWS, (Feb. 10, 2017, 9:58
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-10/yellen-urged-tonix-stress-tests-as-gop-pursues-banks-wish-list [https://perma.cc/4LL6-XTCA].
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scenarios in advance for notice and comment and to publish
the supervisory models that anchor the exercise. The Treasury
Department endorsed these recommendations and also recommended that the Fed drastically downsize the exercise.248
The current administration envisions stress tests that are
essentially additions to the Basel III risk-based capital rules:
another form of asset weighting that determines ex ante how
much equity financing a firm must use in its business. But
this would eliminate the benefits of substantive oversight that
the current program provides. There is no reason to think that
macroprudential policy can be conducted in concert with the
industry, just as there is no reason to think that monetary
policy can be conducted by publishing proposals to raise the
Federal funds rate for notice and comment.
Indeed, the Treasury Department’s rationale for objecting
to CCAR threatens to eliminate all substantive oversight. As
the Treasury explains,
Subjective assumptions built into the Federal Reserve’s
CCAR models have resulted in an improperly calibrated
stress test, which risks skewing capital requirements and
bank activity away from what market-based decisions would
otherwise dictate and in favor of activity favored by regulators
resulting in excess capital retained by banks, which reduces
lending capacity.249

The Treasury’s current thinking is a version of Greenspan’s
market oversight philosophy. Part of Treasury’s concern may
derive from the fact that today’s financial conglomerates are
engaging in nonmonetary activities for which there may be serious policy reasons to question a broad government role. But
rolling back CCAR to reduce the government’s influence over
the nonmonetary activities of systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs) also means that the government is unable to exercise discretion over the monetary aspects of these
banks’ activities, those which are backstopped by the government’s full faith and credit.
It is worth briefly noting that efforts to constrain post-crisis
agency discretion are not limited to the CCAR program. Other
reforms that introduced substantive oversight have faced sig248
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS 53 (2017) (recommending that “the Federal Reserve subject its stress-testing and capital planning review frameworks to
public notice and comment, including with respect to its models, economic scenarios, and other material parameters and methodologies”).
249
Id.
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nificant industry opposition. For example, the Treasury Department has also recommended that the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) scale back its use of its discretionary
authority to prohibit “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.”250 The industry has targeted the Financial Stability
Oversight Council’s (FSOC) non-bank designations process in
an effort to prevent the government from using its discretion to
expand oversight to systemically important firms.251 The OCC
is facing criticism for raising its CAMELS ratings following the
crisis, and both the Fed and the OCC are under pressure to
reduce their oversight of senior bank managers and directors.252 Given the political and legal pressures that SIFIs exert
on government actors, are today’s conglomerates simply too big
and complex to supervise?
B.

Practical Constraints on Supervising SIFIs

Substantive oversight is difficult—it requires technical expertise and institutional independence. The dual role of SIFIs
as monetary institutions and full service financial intermediaries makes substantive oversight more difficult; it demands expertise in areas that are technically complex, and it is
more politically challenging for the agencies to justify intensive
government oversight of financial activity that is not closely
related to basic government monetary objectives. By contrast,
rules offer benefits; they clarify permissible outcomes in advance, thereby reducing costs to industry and easing
enforcement.
The socially optimal mix of tools, then, is not necessarily
the same as the optimal mix of tools from the perspective of the
bankers, legislators, and regulators involved in formulating a
legal regime. There are at least four reasons why supervisors of
250

Id. at 81.
For example, the industry has challenged the FSOC’s exercise of its authority to designate non-bank financial institutions for enhanced prudential supervision by the Federal Reserve. See e.g., MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight
Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 242 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding “fundamental violations
of established administrative law”); see also PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 8
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (seeking to strike down a Dodd-Frank provision that provided
that the President could only remove the CFPB’s director for cause).
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See Examination of the Federal Financial Regulatory System and Opportunities for Reform Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. (2017) (testimony of Greg Baer, President, The
Clearing House Association) (transcript available at https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-115-ba15-wstate-gbaer-20170406.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2D2D-JB5Y]) (suggesting CCAR, CAMELs ratings, and board
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banks might choose to focus on compliance instead of
outcomes.
The first is ideological—some policymakers oppose discretionary action because they subscribe to a certain political philosophy concerning the proper relationship between private
business and the state. Under this view, call it rule absolutism,
regulators should be permitted to write rules to advance safety
and soundness, but bankers should be allowed, indeed encouraged, to take whatever steps they see fit to maximize their
profits as long as they comply with the rules. The problem with
discretionary oversight, then, is not its goals but its methods.
By making law at the point of application it jeopardizes firstorder liberty interests.
The absolutist view has a certain appeal: it preserves a
sense of fairness and non-arbitrariness, reduces the power of
government officials, and minimizes chilling effects. It is particularly attractive with respect to the nonmonetary financial
activities of SIFIs. The theoretical case for having these functions disciplined by the market is far stronger than the case for
having monetary functions governed in that manner. Yet because the two are combined and the former is subsidized by the
central bank, it is impossible to oversee them separately. On
the other hand, a rules-only regime for monetary institutions
can be quite costly if the rules are poorly crafted or banks seek
to evade them. For absolutists, the only acceptable response to
this problem is for the government to write better rules. The
burden, in other words, is on the state to get the rules right, not
on the market to infer the state’s purposes.
The second reason is practical—supervisors may believe
that it is simply too technically challenging to assess the permissibility of certain private activity. Again, this is a problem
with respect to the nonmonetary activities of financial conglomerates. For example, LCBOs have hundreds of thousands of
employees in dozens of countries. They buy and sell bespoke
financial instruments in opaque markets. Accordingly, the
costs of discretionary oversight may outweigh its benefits.
Agencies may pursue procedural oversight because it is more
tractable. Assuming the same technical difficulties apply to
rule writing, adherents to this view may be fatalists, believing,
for example, that banks will inevitably extract public wealth
and impose costs on others. They may also be structural reformers, advocating for reduced complexity and new activities
restrictions.
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The third reason is professional. Many regulatory agencies
are run by lawyers and administrators. Unlike financiers, who
are well-equipped to think about risk-taking and risk management, lawyers are trained to think about controls and compliance. It is much easier for lawyers to police processes, than it
is for them to assess the extent of a bank’s financial
exposures.253
The fourth reason is political.254 Substantive oversight is
contentious. Procedural oversight, like rules, generally does
not require deciding fundamental, value-laden issues over and
over. Regulators, bankers, and the public may agree on the
value of the process, despite disagreeing on the desirability and
acceptability of various outcomes. It is likely to be far less
difficult to fault a bank for failing to conduct a timely audit of
its books, or failing to inform the board about significant highrisk ventures, than to analyze a set of trades and force the bank
to divest them.255 This is particularly problematic in the case
of nonmonetary activities, which are much harder for the government to assess and which have not historically been subject
to the same sort of government oversight and control.
Because substantive oversight constrains profitable outcomes, it can create conflict over the distinction between permissible and impermissible activities, and lead to lawsuits.
Banks may mount a political campaign against their supervisors, and agencies are vulnerable to punishment by Congress
through hearings, funding cuts, and the appointment of new
political leadership. The individuals who bring enforcement
actions may face professional consequences for challenging
powerful industry interests, and senior Washington officials
may balk at the exercise of discretion by regional Reserve
Banks and local OCC offices.
Richard Spillenkothen, who was the senior supervisory official at the Fed during the Deregulatory Era, noted that part of
the reason for RFS was that it “was less confrontational.”256
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norms, strategic calculation, and liberal morality all condemn).
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There was “a desire,” he explained, “not to inject an element of
contentiousness into what was felt to be a constructive or equable relationship with management.”257 Thus, even if supervisors have the necessary technical expertise and believe that
rules are not sufficient to ensure safe banking, they may shy
away from incurring these costs.258
One reason substantive oversight of LCBOs has reappeared in the form of CCAR is that CCAR shields agencies from
some of these pressures. For example, CCAR is centralized in
Washington, with Fed Governors making the major decisions;
it uses econometric models and draws on the expertise of dozens of Ph.D. economists; it assesses all the major firms simultaneously, creating winners at the same time as it creates
losers; it publicly releases the results; it relies upon the authority of the central bank qua central bank; and it has its roots in
a widely-lauded crisis-response mechanism that is credited
with mitigating the financial panic in 2008.
Outside of CCAR, we might expect supervisors, facing political, professional, and legal risks from the exercise of discretion, to be drawn to the bureaucratic safe harbor offered by
procedural interpretations of safety and soundness and the
inarguable clarity of bright-line rules. Proceduralism, after all,
reduces conflict between supervisors in the field and senior
officials in Washington, as well as with bank executives, Congressional representatives opposed to supervisory discretion,
and agency lawyers, who themselves prefer the certainty of
rules.
C.

Consequences of a Rules-Only Regime

As memory of the crisis recedes and political winds shift,
we might expect these pressures and drivers of proceduralism
to increase further. This could be cause for concern as Martin,
Yellen, Dudley, and others have suggested that we need
macroprudential discretion to properly oversee monetary affairs. A system without discretion is incompatible with the
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2010-05-31%20FRB%20Richard%
20Spillenkothen%20Paper-%20Observations%20on%20the%20Performance%20
of%20Prudential%20Supervision.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J4F-Q8RE].
257
Id.
258
Some literature suggests that these costs may be insurmountable, depending on the size and political power of the industry. See generally Gary S. Becker, A
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON.
371 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1277 (1989); Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621 (2012).
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government backstop provided to banks as monetary institutions. Without substantive oversight, we might expect to see,
for example:
1.

More Regulatory Arbitrage. The existence of deposit
insurance and liquidity insurance incentivizes bankers
to defeat rules. With access to nonmonetary financial
instruments such as high-risk securities and derivatives, it is almost trivially easy for firms to design ways
to outsmart static rules. Rules cannot possibly be
written to cover the wide range of risks SIFIs can engage in.
2. Staleness. Rules can only be written in advance. The
attempt to hard code differences between assets and
liabilities on a bank’s balance sheet is unlikely to account for changes in markets and economic
conditions.
3. Cultural Deterioration. A rules-based regime, in which
regulated actors do not expect substantive oversight
may, perversely, incentivize greater risk-taking and
loop-holing behavior, leading to decreased compliance
and increased misconduct.259
4. Depleted Regulatory Morale. The absence of substantive oversight may drain meaning from the underlying
norms and lead to confusion about the purpose of the
legal regime, reducing compliance with the rules.260
5. Increased Inefficiency. In the absence of substantive
oversight, excessive proceduralism may encourage
wasteful process-development by banks to satisfy
supervisors.
6. Less Macroprudential Discretion. Macroprudential efforts will be hampered if supervisors are not able to use
CCAR and other tools to restrict lending during expansionary periods.
259
See FIN. STABILITY B., STOCKTAKE OF EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN GOVERNANCE
FRAMEWORKS TO MITIGATE MISCONDUCT RISKS 60 (2017); Tom R. Tyler & Steven L.
Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct? The Antecedents
of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 ACAD. MGM. J. 1143, 1144 (2005).
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“Regulatory morale” is a term I am drawing from the tax literature, which
discusses a concept called “tax morale.” See generally Ronald G. Cummings et al.,
Tax Morale Affects Tax Compliance: Evidence from Surveys and an Artefactual
Field Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 447 (2009); Erzo F.P. Luttmer &
Monica Singhal, Tax Morale, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 149 (2014); see also TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (arguing that the perceived legitimacy of the legal
regime drives compliance with it).
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Thus, some degree of discretion is likely needed to maintain a
stable and resilient monetary system. But substantive oversight may only be feasible if banks are focused on banking; that
is, if they are focused on issuing money-like instruments, facilitating payments, investing in sovereign debt obligations, and
originating high-quality credit assets. Although Greenspan
was wrong about the ability of the market to regulate LCBOs,
he may have been right about the inability of the government to
supervise them, effectively and consistently over time, in the
face of technical complexity, political pressure, and other practical constraints.
CONCLUSION
Banking law has always featured both rules and standards. By distinguishing between two ways of writing rules
and two ways of enforcing standards, this Article reveals how a
group of policymakers fundamentally transformed banking law
in the 1980s and 1990s. These officials allowed specialized
monetary institutions to grow into diversified financial conglomerates by removing bans and developing a new supervisory
policy, which relied on ex ante risk-based capital rules to facilitate market discipline. They all but eliminated discretionary
oversight. After the crisis, policymakers repudiated the market-based approach, but largely retained the market-based
methods. Today, banking law exhibits a mix of pre-crisis formulas, procedural oversight, and stress testing, although this
discretionary exercise is under sustained assault. Given the
critical monetary functions banks perform in our economy, and
the problems with relying entirely on rules and on the market
to oversee those functions, we must reconsider the sustainability of our current legal strategies. We should focus on
the ways in which the current regime unsustainably and inappropriately combines the oversight of monetary institutions
with the oversight of unrelated financial activity. Ultimately,
we need a monetary architecture that is properly supervised—
after all, monetary functions have long been the responsibility
of the state and are still backstopped by its full faith and credit.

